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ABSTRACT.
What are or should be the economic and developmental 
objectives of Tansania's regime for the exploitation of her 
fisheries? How suitable are the traditional techniques for 
managing access in the context of her social - economic 
outlook? What are the prospects for alternative strategies? 
Can these strategies be appropriately employed in the context 
of the UN Law of the Sea Convention, and within the existing 
institutional framework? What real or potential benefits does 
Tanzania obtain or stand to obtain in the light of an access 
regime suitable to its socio-economic setting?
V
Fishery
I nt rod Lie
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Management in the Context of the Tanzania's 
Administration of Maritime Resources.
page
I. A Definition Of The Problem.
1.1. The Premise: UNCLOS III ....... ...........
1.2. The Structural Setting Of The Industry ...
1.3. The Issues..........'.....................
II. Concepts And Implications.
2.1. Managerial Concepts and Policy Implications
2.2. ResoLir c e I mp 1 i c at i ons ....
2.3. Strategies for Adoption ..................
III. Challenges For Tanzania.
3.1. The Organization and its Constraints
3.2. Issues in National Fisheries ......
3.3. Issues om Access by Foreign Fleets .
IV. A Regional Approach.
4.1. The Setting ...............................
4.2. A Justification for Joint Action:
- Constraints and Prospects ..
V. Conclusions and R^ecommendat ions.
5.1. A Summary of the Issues ......
5.2. The Alternatives ..............
5.3. Conclusions and Recommendations
103
114
118
Annex .....
Bibliography
125
132
I iMTR:or>i_JC-r i om
In 1373, almost a decade before the conclusion of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, the United 
Republic of Tanzania proclaimed the extension of her 
territorial sea from 12 to 50 nautical, miles. It was not 
suprising however that in making this declaration the 
expressed objective was claimed, amongst other, as an effort 
to keep foreign fishing vessels, away There was no doubt
that the interest which the government was trying to preserve 
by this undertaking was essentially an economic interest.
The advent of the 1382 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, which Tanzania has since ratified, and which 
reverted her territorial sea claim to the pre- 1373 twelve 
nautical miles but augmented by a IBS nautical miles 
Exclusive Economic C fishery ) Zone was a highly welcome 
development. For Tanzania, like many other states, the 
extended national Jurisdiction while presenting a new and 
unprecedented opportunity to harvest the benefits of the 
living and non-living resources off her shores, it also 
exposed her to equally new and unprecedented challenges in 
relation to her strategies and policies for fisheries 
management in the context of her development objectives.
In as much as different countries have reacted 
differently in their attempt to harvest the perceived 
fortunes attendant to the extended maritime Jurisdiction, 
this study seeks to examine and evaluate, the assumptions and 
approaches - legal and economic which Tanzania has resorted 
to in pursuit of the interest of her people and in conformity 
with her obligations under the 1382 UN Law of the Sea 
Convent ion.
Further, because the primary interest for Tanzania's 
extension of her marine territorial Jurisdiction was
i
economic, an examination is made '^o evaluate the extent to 
which the establishment of the 200 nautical mile EEZ has 
contributed to the economic development of Tanzania on 
account the ability of the government to manage this vast 
area it secured. Here the study also seeks to identify short 
and long term opportunities available to the country and 
cautions against overly ambitious objectives.
Given the fact that, at least for Tanzania and the other 
countries in the region, the short term potential attendant 
to the new jurisdiction seems largely to rest on its living 
resources, the immediate focus of interest would thus rest on 
the nature and the effect the existing management regime has 
placed on the exploitation and development of these resource 
and, the extent to which this has been or could be of benefit 
to the country.
The underlying assumption here is that Tanzania has the 
interest and indeed the obligation to manage access to these 
resources both by its local and foreign fleets. In the 
process, though, she has to ensure that these resources do 
not only contribute to the betterment of the welfare of her 
fishermen but also institute a conservatory regime to ensure 
the sustainability of these resources.
This understanding, for renewable resources and 
particularly fisheries, raises issues whose implications go 
far beyond the simple confines of national boundaries and 
consequently call for a review of the regional and 
international measures designed to assist in the management 
of these resources. Here the countries comprising the South 
West Indian Ocean <SWID) become the primary focus of 
Tanzania's efforts towards a broader management regime.
The first chapter discusses the background against which 
Tanzania's fishery management has been taking place. It also 
introduces the approaches which the study will focus. The 
second chapter dwells on the theoretical framework for the 
management of fishery resources and points out some 
strategies thought to provide the discipline for effective
2
manacjement in the context of the Tanzanian fishery. In the 
third chapter, challenges facing the management of the 
Tanzanian fishery are examined in the light of the background 
provided in the preceding chapters. While in the fourth 
chapter the potential and possibilities presented by a broad 
approach to the management and exploitation of the resources 
is examined and evaluated.
Ultimately, having evaluated both the constraints and 
prospects, this study in chapter five, offers some 
alternatives and recommendations considered not only 
objective but relatively cost effective as part of a strategy 
for both Tanzania and the region towards the beneficial and 
sustainable exploitation of her living marine resources.
A H>e-firix‘fcion O-f T l~i e i=> v cz*lrj X em _
1.1. The Premise: UNCLOS III.
The United Republic of Tanzania was an avid 
participant in the negotiations leading to the adoption of 
the Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, at Montego Bay, 
Jamaica. The Tanzanian contribution, while more conspicuous 
in the Second Committee where its Chief Delegate , Mr. Joseph 
Warioba, was elected Chairman, was no less committed to the 
sub committee dealing with fisheries where, as circumstances 
demanded, a fisheries expert, such as Mr. Libaba, was 
included as a member of the delegation. This involvement was 
further pronounced within the ranks.of the Afro - Asian Legal 
Consultative Committee (P>LCC:>, the Organisation of African 
Unity COAU'.) , and within the developing group of countries 
commonly known as the Group of 77, as they all in different 
ways tried to protect and promote their varied interests in 
the then evolving law of the sea.
Here, in an evaluation of fishery management 
in Tanzania, it is instructive to examine what constitutes 
its primary interest in relation to the ocean during the 
formulation of the UN Law of the Sea Convention. The 
immediate advantage this offers has to do with the degree to 
which, given its initial interest, the conclusion of the 
Convention may have influenced Tanzania's subsequent actions 
or inactions.
It is interesting that while there was sufficient 
precedence in relation to claims for exclusive fishery zones 
being masqueraded as attempts to conserve fisheries, many
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developing countries did not choose to make such pretences.® 
Most likely this position was dictated upon by their apparent 
limitations in technological and economic capabilities to 
support a claim of such grandeur. .
For Tanzania however, the extension of her coastal 
jurisdiction was more appealing and significant in terms of 
the economic opportunities it offered or protected. For 
her, and many other similarly developing countries, this 
preoccupation was so strong that the management and 
conservatory "regime" provided by the 1958 Convention on 
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High 
Seas was not acceptable even as a basis for further 
negotiations and modifications; and rightly so!
Consider Article 7 of that Convention which 
provided that any coastal state may, with a view to the 
maintenance of productivity of the living resources of the 
sea , adopt unilateral measures of conservation appropriate 
to any stock of fish or other marine resources in an area of 
the high sea adjacent to its territorial sea, provided that 
negotiations to that effect with the other states concerned 
have not led to an agreement within six months. Quite 
harml ess!
However, Article 7 paragraph 2 provides that such 
measures shall be valid as to other states only if the 
following requirements were fulfilled:
i) that there is a need for urgent application 
of conservation measures in the light of 
the existing knowledge of the fishery;
ii) that the measures adopted are based on 
appropriate scientific findings;
iii) that such measures do not discriminate in 
form or in fact foreign fishermen.
That the 1958 Convention favored the technological 
and scientifically developed nations was a matter of no 
dispute. That most developing countries were then either 
under colonial bondage or not represented militated against
its acceptability amongst many in the General Assembly of the 
UN when it was thought necessary to open a new alliance in 
the management of ocean resources.
Behind these efforts to find acceptable 
international standards for the management of world living 
and non - living resources, could be discerned a thinking 
amongst developing countries that they should not be denied 
mandate to exercise control of expanded maritime 
.jurisdictions solely on account of their scientific 
shortcomings. In essence while many amongst ma.jor developed 
fishing nations wished, to sub.ject national Jurisdiction to 
scientific capabilities, developing countries clamored for 
that right inspite of their being aware of the importance of 
scientific capabilities to adequately exploit and manage the 
same. This concern, while important, was nevertheless, of 
secondary importance.
Consequently, Part V, Exclusive Economic Zone, of 
the Law of the Sea Convention resulted as the best compromise 
giving coastal states a variety of legal privileges ranging 
from sovereign rights. Jurisdictional rights and simple 
rights. To a larger extent however this compromise 
indicates the complex nature of the legal regime surrounding 
the EEZ but also the intensity of the competing claims 
involved. This new regime has also been categorised as sui 
generis representing a unique package where both coastal and 
other states have rights.®
What was significant in the compromise establishing 
the EEZ is that while as per Article 56 of the 19S2 
Convention coastal states, amongst whom many were also 
developed states, secured sovereign rights for exploring, 
exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources of 
the EEZ, other states were able to secure and preserve 
traditional rights such as the freedom of navigation.
To countries like Tanzania the benefits attendant to the 
exploration and exploitation of the non-living resources of 
her EEZ remain important in the long run. However in the
&
short term fishing offers the most attractive and more 
feasible alternative. The critical balance though rests 
between its needs for food and revenue, and its obligation to 
ensure that this resource base is not only exploited 
fruitfully but sustainably.
Crucial to this undertaking" therefore are the 
provisions of Article 61 ?•< 62 of the 1982 Convention, the
thrust of which are closely examined in Chapter II. These 
oblige coastal states to ensure that resources are properly 
managed so as to avoid over exploitation. To developing 
countries, and Tanzania in particular, these seem to be 
the objectives filled with the most difficulties and 
frustrations. This is due to two apparently contradictory 
reasons. On one hand, while • Tanzania may wish to secure the 
potential benefits of its ocean resources for exploitation, 
either by its local or foreign fleets, or in a joint venture 
basis, she can invariably only do so rationally when she has 
the knowledge about the state of the stock. Otherwise 
Tanzania stands to loose economically, and also risks 
mismanagement of her resources which are placed in jeopardy.
On the other hand, though Tanzania remains acutely aware 
of the relevance of the technical aspects related to the 
management of resources, she is at the same time constrained 
by the very financial benefits she is seeking to obtain from 
the resources.
This is not to say that the vicious circle cannot 
be broken. Indeed while existing constraints are a reality 
there is yet another reality. Any resource improperly managed 
would not in the long run serve the interest of the people 
and the country. Basic to this realisation lies the truth 
that, within its own modest capabilities, there is potential 
enough to develop and administer an operational scheme for 
acquiring information about the state of the stock which 
would, with time, develop to serve both its resource and 
economic interests.
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1.2. The Structural Setting of the Industry.
The United Republic of Tanzania represents an area 
of' 945 100 sq km, a 1988 population estimate of 25 million, 
and a per capita income of about 147 US dollars.® It also 
represents one of the 42 countries considered by the United 
Nation as least developed amongst the developing countries.
Located between latitudes 2 and 12 South, and longitude 
30 and 40 East, Tanzania has a coastline of about 800 km, an 
EEZ adjacent to that of Kenya in the north-east, Mozambique 
in the south-east, and opposite that of the Comoros and the 
Seychelles on the east. Tanzania is part of the West Indian 
Ocean and is also a member of a group of countries comprising 
the South West Indian Ocean CSWIO) including Comoro, Kenya, 
Seychelles, Somali, Madagascar, Mauritius and Mozambique. 
Tanzania is further endowed with three inland lakes, namely: 
Victoria on the north-west; Tanganyika on the west; and, 
Nyasa on the south-west.
While Tanzania claims a territorial sea of 12 nautical 
miles she has a rather very limited continental shelf 
characterized by a sharply falling edge. This shelf varies in 
length to a minimum of six kilometers at two points including 
Mafia and Zanzibar Islands. The northern Island, Pemba, does 
not form part of the shelf and is in fact separated by a deep 
channel of about 56 kilometers wide and 800 to 1000 meters 
deep. Because of the sharp drop of the shelf, the 200 meter 
line is fairly close inshore and as a consequence fishing 
activities have also largely been confined within this 
inshore belt and around the Islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and 
Mafia.
Even within this belt, however, further limitation on 
fishing activity such as trawling is imposed by significant 
coral formation. These coral reefs have, nevertheless, proven 
useful breeding and feeding grounds for inshore fishes though 
the reefs have also suffered from silt deposits occasioned by
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the five major rivers; Pangani, Wami, Ruvu, Rufiji and Ruvuma 
from whose mouths the richest shrimp grounds in the country 
are available.
The absence of an up-welling current along the western 
coast of Tanzania’s Indian Ocean has also contributed in 
making this side of the ocean very limited in plankton growth 
and hence of general low productivity compared to other 
oceans. This is further exacerbated by the common fact that 
tropical seas compared to temperate ones are not as 
productive.
The Trad itional Sector. It is from these fishing grounds 
estimated to be over 12 000 sq km."^, that the majority of the 
country’s marine fishing effort is concentrated and largely 
conducted by an artisanal sector. In 1986 this artisanal 
sector accounted for about 907. of all the total marine catch 
for mainland Tanzania of about 46 985 tones and employing 
about 12 000 fishermen.® This activity is scattered all along 
the coastline and around Zanzibar and Pemba where the sector 
employed about 15-16 000 with reported catches of about 25 
000 tonnes.® In this regard, principal target species include 
snapper, kingfish, sharks, rays, shrimps, lobsters, sea 
cucumber and seasonal runs of migratory fish such as tuna and 
baracuda king.
With this effort and limitations fishermen use a wide 
variety of fishing gear designs and methods. Communities in 
and around the coast are known to use a variety of methods 
and, not unusually, devote their attention to one method of 
preferance for either general use or for a specie target.
Most unusually though is the fact that often, inspite of 
years and at times generations of engaging in fishing, these 
fishermen do not generally own the gear. In many cases both 
the gear and the boat may belong to an individual within or 
without the community who is not engaged in fishing. Such 
owners are normally only entitled to a certain percentage of 
the value of the catch or a specific amount of money on a 
weekly or monthly basis agreed to in advance. This has
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expectedly given rise to private individuals who have 
invested in buying and supplying boats, nets motors etc, to 
fishermen in some of these communities and have themselves 
remained as mere beneficiaries of an appropriate part of the 
value generated by their investment.
While this has served to employ fishermen who otherwise 
may have remained unemployed it has nevertheless failed to 
give any substantive benefits to the fishernien involved in 
terms of improving the quality of their lives and working 
environment. Their pattern of expenditure has largely 
remained hand to mouth with very few able to break out of the 
"leasing" dependence. Not suprising therefore incomes amongst 
fishing communities in Tanzania have in many occasions been 
below those of other agricultural communities. This gives 
rise to questions about the success of government policies in 
this sector. What turns out as being interesting though is 
that this pattern of limited or negative gains to such 
communities is not peculiar to Tanzania but has also been 
observed in other developing countries of Southeast Asia.
It is equally of interest to observe that while the 
number of artisanal fishermen and fishing boats has been on 
the increase (Table, 1) the welfare of this community has 
remained relatively unchanged. This has very significant 
implications to the broad developmental goals of the 
government.
The observed increases could be misleading. For one, it 
does not necessarily mean the sector is doing well, and for 
another it could well represent an increase on the number of 
families dependant on the subsistence sector both of which do 
not auqur well to any development objectives. These numbers 
may only suggest an untold story. They also do reveal 
something about the vulnerability of the Tanzanian artisanal 
sector. Between 1978 and 1981 there appears to have been a 
dramatic decline of those engaged in fishing, from around 10 
000 to 5 000. And yet in 1983 these numbers shot up to above 
13 000. It is further suprising that inspite this recorded
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Table 1
Annual Marine Fish Catches & Other Statistics. 
1978 1984
Years 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Rrtisarnal Fishery:
Catch Weights 
(tonnes)
46708 33104 29593 32716 23669 33371 39810 = 45501
No. of Fishermen 9799 8120 7596 4755 13499 na 13783 - 12619
No. of Boats 4498 2906 2238 3001 3433 3556 3690 = 3690
Industrial Fishery: CTRFICO & DflRFISH)
'
Catch Weights 
(tonnes)
608 1115 1081 1483
No. of Vessels na 10 10 10
Statistics Section, Fiheries Division Tanzania.Source: L. B. Nhuani. Summary of Fisheries & Resources Information.
decline catches per boat were not affected in 1981 but in 
1982.
It has been suggested that this shift from the fishery 
was due to excessive reef damage occasioned by dynamite 
fishing which was also a result of gear shortage in the 
market. That, in a way, the fishermen engaged in killing the 
goose that laid the golden egg. However, the fact that the 
return to fishing was almost threefold questions the capacity 
of the reefs to regenerate and therefore to support the 
influx. It can also be questioning the exactness of the 
entire data base.
It remains of interest to determine the occupation to 
which these migratory or part time fishermen would take 
refuqe to during recessions or difficulties. And to explore 
why that other sector remains a mere sector of refuge and not 
an alternative substitute to an otherwise unattractive 
sector. However, because most fishermen have no special 
skills, peasant farming could be the activity of engagement 
during these hard times. Petty trading or hawking is yet 
another possibility.
Dynamite fishing is reported as a regular occurrence 
along the coast and fishermen, while not willing to admit 
their involvement, would nevertheless pretend to sympathise 
with those "compelled" to resort to this method on account of 
gear shortage or its high cost. While it is an illegal 
activity,and its intensity a matter of public concern, the 
seriousness of its destructive effects cannot be witnessed by 
the level of prosecutions against real or suspected culprits. 
As seen from the legal end where defaulters are brought to 
face the consequences of the law, the reported regular 
occurrences can only be far in between.
Another important element related to this artisanal 
sector is the type of boats generally used. Individual 
fishermen operating without "leased" boats would most often 
use a small outrigged canoe able to carry about three 
persons. Co-operatively owned vessels or those belonging to
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richer fishermen, are' relatively better and bigger and are 
able to carry up to eight people. Boats are of various types: 
mtumbwi which is a dugout canoe propelled by paddlingj 
noalawa. which is a dugout canoe with sails and fitted with 
outriggers for stability; mashua. which is a planked boat of 
about 5 - 10 meters in length fitted with sails; and, boti, 
which is a motorised boat.*-^
Most of these boats are constructed largely out of tree 
trunks which when added to tree felling as source of wood for 
fish smoking have contributed to the problem of logging and 
thus deforestation in coastal areas. While it should not 
mean that at the moment boat construction should be stopped 
it still demands that in the long run both the fishermen and 
the government need to face up to the problem. To the 
government there is a greater need in relation to its forest 
policy to find suitable alternatives both for purposes of up 
grading the efficiency of the fishery sector and its general 
ec onomic obJ ec tives.
The type of gear commonly used in the artisanal fishery 
of Tanzania vary from handlines, gill nets, basket traps, 
shark gill nets, beach seines, cast nets, long lines, to 
fixed (tidall traps.It should be noted that some 
communities would prefer one gear over the rest for one or 
another specie. The greatest disadvantage of some of the 
gear rests in their indiscriminate nature of catching 
everything that tries to pass through - adult and Juveniles 
alike.
For economic reasons most of the marine artisanal 
activities have been concentrated around major towns such as 
Dar-es-salaam, Tanga, Zanzibar, Pemba, Lindi and Mtwara where 
it has been possible to reach bigger consumer populations. 
Here it has also been possible to secure higher values for 
landed fish on account of higher incomes enjoyed by urban 
dwellers. It has also, due to constant high demand for fish 
when landed, reduced spoilages arising from storage 
deficiencies. At some point, especially during the early
13
80’s, the most relatively successfully artisanal communities 
were those organized into fishing co-operatives. Today for 
some reason most have disintegrated.
In dust r ial Fishing; .UJhile the artisanal sector has with 
great effort tried to meet the needs for fish as the main 
source of animal protein to a growing segment of the coastal 
population, there has been in the last decade a growth of a 
local commercial fleet comprising about six purse seiners and 
ten trawlers. These have, to a great extent, attempted to 
meet the demand pf the export market.
Purse seining activity has tended to concentrate in the 
north and around Zanzibar while trawlers have targeted 
shrimp as the specie of preferance and thus concentrated 
along the Rufiji, Wami and Ruvu deltas. Most of the fleet is 
medium sized about 10 to 25 meters and 30 to 90 grt. with the 
exception of two trawlers owned by the Tanzania Fisheries 
Corporation <TAFIC0) of 32 meters and 150 grt.
Foreign operators in the Tanzania Fisheries sector over 
the years were largely restricted by a deliberate government 
policy which favor^ecl .joint ventures with the state owned 
corporat ion, TAFICO. However, the local private sector
involvement in the industry has been expanding from the late 
70’-s having realised the potential value of prawns could in 
foreign markets. The Licensing Unit of the Fisheries Division 
indicate 12 foreign owned trawlers were authorised to operate 
with three mother ships as of November 1990.
Following the promulgation of an investment promotion 
policy in 1990 there has been an influx of interested foreign 
applicants seeking authorisation to either operate
independently or on joint venture basis. Most of these have 
interest in the crustaceans, particularly shrimp and lobster, 
and off-shore pelagics such as tuna.
For Tanzanian fisheries, shrimp remains the leading 
specie for the foreign market. Export figures 'for the year 
1991 may reveal values which had never been recorded before.
14
Because crustaceans are not a specie of choice and preference 
for most of the local population], the export growth of these 
crustaceans does present a conflict with the lo>_al market 
when shrimp trawlers discard by-catches which are of interest 
to the artisanal fleet. At the same time this export is 
earning the cciuntry invaluable foreign exchange.
It wciuld be wrcing thc<ugh, to assume that the ccimmercial 
fleet has expanded, without certain conflicts arising. The 
gy; i S'); gp,; 0 and operatic'ns between the traditional sector and 
the thriving industrial fleet has not been without
skirmishes. There are two reasons for this. One has been 
that artisanal fishermen along Bagamoyo in the Wami and Ruvu 
deltas are ccinvinced that the ciperation of big vessels 
while trawling for shrimp "chases" species of their
p j'g f gi'enc e, The second reascin is that there are sume 
artisanal fishermen interested in the crustaceans and this 
c cimpet i t i c>n fc>r crustaceans seems a IC'C'Sing battle.
It however seems that the government has yet to see the 
worst of this delicate balance of interests. As the growth 
and diverse uses of« these fishing grounds continues to 
expand, so does the potential for conflict. This is further 
heightened by the fact that within their own lc"_alities 
fishermen tend to think the local government agency
respc'nsible for resolving such conflicts is either helpless 
or in alliance with the "big vessel" operators.
Further fishermen have expressed concern about growing 
encroachment into areas of their traditional activity by "big 
vessels" belonging to "wakubwa" that is, big shots. The 
danger these attitude may pose when left unchecked is that 
any conflict resolution mechanism which may be instituted 
could very quickly loose its credibility to the detriment of 
the government administration and its fishing interests.
Yet, the potential rapid expansion of the industrial 
sector cannot be ignored. While Table 1 suggests a doubling 
of catches within a period of four years between 1382 and
15
1986 this can only be accepted as being very conservative 
given that it only represents reported catches of two 
entities, TAFICO and DARFISH, to the exclusion of a number of 
other private operators who had secured licences during this 
early entry period..
Mar keting; Because the local fishing industry cannot 
presently be classified as strong (though the potential is 
certainly so) the marketing and distribution side of the 
industry has over the years remained relatively weak. As a 
consequence, while the Tanzanian population is relatively 
more active in fishing than their immediate neighbors of 
Kenya, the Tanzanians have comparatively earned less than the 
Kenyans.
In this regard, Tanzanian geography has acted both as an 
advantage and a disadvantage. The extended coastline, while 
giving a relatively bigger fishing area, has also dispersed 
potential markets, especially due to existing poor 
communications infrastructure. Still the country’s population 
offers an advantage in terms of the potential market for the 
fishing industry.
Though demand for fish for human consumption has notably 
been on the increase especially around major cities due to 
among other things the rise of beef prices, the structure o-f 
the operations of the artisanal sector which has largely been 
responsible for satisfying this aspect has remained 
unchanged.
Fish has over years been landed and sold on the spot 
either directly to consumers or to middlemen. Where fishermen 
have to market the product themselves, often after a long 
night out at sea, on small canoes or boats, there have been 
claims by the fishermen that they are merely landing to get a 
fair return of their labour and product so as to be able to 
retreat for rest as soon as possible.
For those that are able to have family members assume 
trading after landing they are also faced with difficulties 
relating to storage. Most of the landing sites do not have
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cold storage facilities and thus fishermen or traders have to 
rely on ice,bought from vendors in town which, given the high 
tropical temperatures can only last for so long.
Consequently, and most often on a days end, when denriand is 
not sufficient to exhaust the available supply, fish prices 
are comparatively lower than at any time of the day. This 
usually results in lower incomes occasioned by throw-away 
prices and at times even spoilages.
It is true to say that public investment in terms of 
upgrading the basic infrastructure for fishery development 
has been glaringly lacking, resulting in a very poorly 
equipped marketing structure to properly support this sector. 
This has had manifold disadvantages especially to the 
artisanal fishery and the other areas of business activity 
which could gain from the prosperity that this sector of the 
economy could enjoy and generate.
These limitations and possibilities are given detailed 
attention in Chapter III where it is argued that unless the 
government deliberately undertakes certain measures, the 
opportunities offered by the fishery sector can only remain 
an illusive idea for the people and the government’s own 
development plans.
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1.3. The Issues.
In Tanzania, the importance of the fresh water fishery 
cannot be neglected while examining the fishery sector. Over 
soy. of the total fish landings for 1986 estimated to be about 
386 000 metric tones came from the three major lakes; namely, 
Victoria, Tanganyika and Nyasa. (Table 2).
While this study does not focus on the fresh water 
catches both sectors have largely suffered similar 
constraints and many of the potential prospects to be found 
in the marine sector should find validity in the former 
segment as wel1.
Nevertheless both segments indicate one unavoidable 
trend. Tanzania's growing population, estimated about 25 
million in 1988, and a growth rate of about 3.2%, should by 
the year 2000 be around 38 million. Without getting into the 
impact of the governments population policy, this expansion 
would inevitably dictate an increased demand for fresh and 
marine water resource beised protein. This would consequently 
bring pressure to bear upon these resources given that, in 
African terms, Tanzania already has a high fish consumption 
per capita standing at 14. 1 kg per year in 1988, and the 
countries ranking as the 39'”^ country in global catch 
statistics.*’® Most fortunately, Tanzanici fishery can 
potentially make a great contribution not only to the 
country's food supply but also to the general economic well 
being of her people. If properly managed fisheries could 
maintain and even expand its contribution to the economy, as 
shall be discussed in Chapter III, by acting as a catalyst to 
other downstream economic activities that are currently not 
existing.
In budgetary allocation terms the sector has not 
received prominence and may seem to occupy a rather inferior 
position. It nevertheless, though, plays a significant role 
in the economy of the country. And for the marine sector this 
role, and its potential are even more conspicuous. Table 2
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TRBLE 2
Vear-
FISHERIES INDICRTORS 
198 1986
No Of Fishermen No Of Fishing Vessels Catch Cm. tons5 Value CO
1980 Fresh Water 
Marine Water 
Total
38.821
7.596 
“16.■^17
1“1. 162
2.238
16“100
20“1.0“16
29.365
233. “113
703.357
235.277
938.63“1
1981 Fresh Water 
Marine Water 
Total
“10. 175
A. 755 
“1“1930
17800
3.61“1
21.“11“1
221“100
35.536
256.986
858900
279.981
1138861
1982 Fresh Water 
Marine Water 
Total
“13. “172
13. “199
56.971
21.375
3.“13“1
2“1.809
157. “128
52.901
21.329
1“157312
510.018
1967330
1983 Fresh Water 
Marine Water 
Total
“15.90“1
9. “195
55.399
205.706
3“1.“185
2“10. 191
17“1“1033
“160.888
220“1922
17“1“1033
“160.888
220“1922
199-^ Fresh Water 
Marine Water 
Total
■^3.822
13.783
57.605
18100
3.556
21.656
237.203
“10.89
273.093
2685678
6.955
2692633
198-^ Fresh Water Marine Water 
Total
“18.39
11.392
59782
17.92“1
3.0“15
20.969
257.90“1
“12.8“17
300.751
“13“12151
1676269
6018“120
1986 Fresh Water 
Marine Water 
Total
58.505
12.619
71.12“1
18.712
3690
22. “102
339.106 
“16.98“1
386090
6026908
16727“1177-19659
Source: Minisstry of Lands Natural Resources and Tourism: 
Fisheries Division.
indicates that, between 1981 and 1986, while marine sector 
catches averaged around 40 000 metric tons, their value had 
more than trippled. This has though to be seen in the context 
of the export of high priced species such as shrimp valued in 
foreign currency while those marketed locally were affected 
by the devaluation of the. shilling.
In Tanzania, therefore, while the artisanal sector 
accounts for most of the production, its improvement presents 
a great challenge. The gcivernment ’ s attempts to manage the 
resources have had to contend with competing priorities - at 
times due to natural calamities of drought and famine. This 
has ironically limited the potential benefit of this sector 
during times when increased production and proper management 
could have assisted in alleviating some of the hardships 
occasioned by such calamities.
A broad review of the structure of the fishery reveals 
its complex nature. It considerably varies in technology and 
methods of application, from traditional dug out canoes to 
small trawlers and purse seiners. In some areas motorised 
canoes are in competition with non-motor ised ones -at times 
successfully but more often in distrust. Yet in some areas, 
particularly in remote areas, success at fishing is under a 
great disadvantage due to difficulties in reaching markets 
and availability of gear.
The operations of the industrial and foreign fleets in 
Tanzania have not had a very long history, giving rise to the 
need for a closer examination of their activities, their 
problems and the prospects they offer to the country. Apart 
from the activities of TAFICO, either in sole operation, or 
in a .joint venture effort with a Japanese firm, industrial 
fishing activity have largely concentrated on the inshore 
fishery grounds for shrimp. The advent of a new government 
policy promoting foreign investors has also seen the increase 
of applicants for .joint ventures in the fishery sector. While 
this raises possibilities for the local entrepreneurs, 
hitherto precluded from generating foreign exchange, it also
gives rise to serious resource and technical management 
concerns of relevance both to the artisanal and commercial 
fleets.
The significance of this study therefore rests on the 
concept that the desirability of proper resource management 
transcends economic settings and, consequently, for countries 
such, as Tanzania (with relatively limited resources), the 
demand and the urgency for an appropriate and effective 
management regime for the e.v;ploitat ion of her living marine 
resources is made all the more pressing.
There are a number of issues relating to the 
developmental ob.jectives of the government policies on the 
fishery sector and the legal and administrative regime these 
have generated that need to be examined to ensure 
comprehensive assessment of Tanzanian fishery management 
schemes.
The first issue therefore is that when a fragile 
traditional fishery sector operates alongside a relatively 
stronger and aggressive commercial sector, the former, unless 
deliberately protected by specific management tools, may risk 
destruction at great cost both to those who depend on the 
sector for their livelihood as well as to the government.
The second issue, arising from the first, is that 
resource implies benefits, and when no real benefits are 
perceived by those whose activities are the target of 
government regulation, the best of such management objectives 
may most often remain unattainable.
The third issue concerns the appropriateness of the 
application of traditional fishery management strategies. 
While most of these have been effective and time tested in 
developed economies, their application to less developed 
economies with different structural settings, while not 
totally irrelevant, need be approached with caution.
The fourth issue concerns the benefits assumed to derive 
from an extended fishery Jurisdiction. When these benefits 
are largely seen in terms of monetary value, the effects in
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the long run, both to the people, the resources and the 
government can be more detrimental than developmental.
The last issue concerns the possibility that, as
Tanzania and other coastal states increase the use of their 
marine resources, the potential for conflict, locally and 
regionally becomes greater. This leads to an examination of 
the benefits which might be derived by translating national 
management regimes into bilateral and regional programes.
The Methodology; In examining the stated' objectives and 
issues about this study, attention is given to a discussion 
of various aspects of fishery management as practiced by the 
different participants including the government.
Developmental issues of relevance to Tanzania are 
highlighted, problems inherent in the resource are reviewed 
and, broad legal issues pertaining to access by foreign 
flee'ts. Joint ventures, reciprocal enforcements, etc, are put 
into a Tanzanian perspective.
Because effective fishery management constitutes a 
challenging undertaking even in the developed economies, si_ime 
insights experienced and obtained in field studies of fishery 
activities especially with the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Fisheries in England, the fishing industry including 
research institutes in Boulogne - France, and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization CFAO) in Rome, will be useful.
In this context the primary yardstick would constitute 
the government’s own "fishery policy", key and relevant 
domestic legislations such as the Fisheries Act of 1373, and, 
the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act, 198'3.
As a backdrop to this dissertation, the influence and 
effect of the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention is examined 
or explained so that the entire approach, in terms of the 
-assumptions, analysis and conclusions, are better understuud.
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CcDtn c: efi>-t s- d Z m|=> 1 i c: &"fc ions--
"Sustainable Development has been defined as 
’development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’ and implies 
’the maintenance , rational use and enhancement of 
the natural resource base that underpins 
ecological resilience and economic growth*" ■
2.1. Managerial Concepts and Policy Implications.
The fact that the process concluded by the adoption of 
the Law of the Sea Convention resulted in a drastic new 
approach to the management of ocean resources is fairly well 
accepted. The immediate and indeed the most significant 
aspect associated with this change, for developing coastal 
states such as Tanzania, was the demise of the hitherto 
tradition of open access to ocean fisheries.
Open access or the "unrestricted right to fish" which 
has been described as "one of the oldest traditions of 
fishing"* had also proven as being the most destructive 
approach towards the depletion of the living resources of the 
ocean. Indeed it was this old tradition which Tanzania was up 
against in 1973 when she extended her territorial sea to an 
area 50 miles from her shores. It is also the realization of 
this situation that countries, at times alone and at times
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jointly, undertook to formulate measure^ as a response 
intended to arrest circumstances otherwise potentially 
destructive to the socio- economic needs of their populations 
and industries.
The conclusion of UNCLOS III, as pointed in the previous 
Chapter, formalised and internationalized two major aspects 
in relation to attempts made to exploit and conserve ocean 
resources. First, the creation of the EEZ gave coastal states 
exclusive jurisdiction over extended jurisdiction, but, 
secondly, placed an obligation on these countries to 
undertake management measures designed to conserve these 
r esour c es.
It is however of relevance to note here that, to a 
greater extent, the needs and demands for conservatory 
policies were more in response to pressures brought upon the 
resources of some major coastal fishing countries such as the 
United States but more generally in relation to the increase 
in fishing effort both in the north Atlantic and Pacific 
Oceans.®
While there was a complimentarity of interest between 
major fishing nations to whom conser Vcit ion was as important 
as jurisdiction, many developing nations were preoccupied 
with jurisdictional .concerns believing that conservation 
would emerge in the context of the authority a state obtains 
over a maritime area, with the result that managerial ability 
has remained one of the most challenging obligations assumed 
by developing countries in relation to the EEZ.'^
Fundamental to the obligation of a coastal state such as 
Tanzania to properly manage the living resources within her 
EEZ are the provisions of Article SI and 62 of UNCLOS 1982. 
The first stage as per article SI Cl) places a requirement 
that a coastal state should "determine the allowable catch of 
the living resources in its exclusive economic zone". This, 
as per sub paragraph 3 is to be undertaken on a 'maximum 
sustainable yield’ basis. In a large measure, this is a 
complicated exercise for Tanzania. Complicated because of
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both the technical and financial . limitations which the 
country would have to contend with.
Further, while paragraph 3 gives a maximum sustainable 
yield criteria it also, however, provides for this with a 
caveat, namely, "as qualified by relevant environmental and 
economic factors". On the overall whatever efforts assumed by 
the administration sight should not be lost of the fact that 
"sustainable development is generally the goal, at least in 
theory, of most fisheries management today"® 5-
Whi 1 e the concepts of Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY.), 
Optimum Sustainable Yield COSY), Maximum Economic Yield CMEY) 
and Total Allowable Catch CTAC) are amongst the cornerstones 
of fisheries management as provided by the 19S)c.' Convention, 
they are grounded on critical assumptions of certain basi'_ 
knowledge and research, and , in the case of Tanzania , 
further complicated by the interplay between the more 
predominant artisanal fisheries on one hand, and the emerging 
industrial sector on.the other.
It is not denied nor can it be that the essence
underlying the provisions of both article 61 and
constitutes the need to see that fishery resources are
exploited in a manner which would ensure the long term
protection of the needs and interests of the coastal states. 
It is also undeniable that any management regime can only be 
properly implemented and successful when supported by an 
appropriate knowledge of the fishery stock, its dynamics and 
the regular collection of information on landings and
prevailing economic conditions CKeen.EA 1983). Yet in terms 
of stock assessment the only comprehensive but limited 
surveys that are known to have recently been conducted in 
Tanzanian waters are those undertaken in 1982/83 by the R/V 
Dr. Fridtjof Nansen and m/v Mafunzo ®.
These surveys though were very limited in that the main 
area of focus was the exploration of the potential yields 
for small pelagic and the inshore fishing grounds were thus 
excluded from the survey. Consequently in terms of the
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manaqefneiTt interest of the Administration they have largely 
been compelled to work, even todate, with estimate figures 
extrapolated from this not so recent survey. This presents 
two basic disadvantages. One, the survey is itself outdated, 
and, two, its reliability could be highly unreliable 
particularly with regard to the inshore grounds whose 
biological dynamics are essentially different than the 
offshore grounds. It has nevertheless been of considerable 
use in relation tci the later grounds. Proving that
information is a basic tool for fishery management and that 
lack of the same exposes the administration and ultimately 
the country to a lot of disadvantages.
I But in the settings of Tanzanian artisanal fisheries 
sector, how best can this information be obtained and applied 
for management purposes? how can the Administration determine 
the MSY? The basic problem lies in the fact that all too 
often, fishery statistics, given the extended coastline and 
the existing communication difficulties, are either non­
existent, or so inacurate that no meaningful' use can be made 
of them.
While the following chapter examines some of the 
approaches Tanzania should adopt it should be said here that, 
without the benefit of the necessary stock assessment data, 
the capability of Tanzania to determine her MSY would remain 
highly doubtful. Any approaches though should take into 
account that even with the best skills and resources, such 
assessment would not only take considerable effort running 
through a number of years but will also require a firm 
commitment of the policy makers and their appreciation of the 
usefulness of this exercise and its implications to the 
developmental objectives the country has placed upon itself.
Kesteven C19S3) underlines this point by emphasizing 
that "developing countries with valuable fishery resources 
need fishery science in self defense and positively to their 
own advantage"^. He further proposes that this kind of 
fishery science must be locally generated giving the country
or countries a better claim to their data which may thus be
placed to use with all the confidence involved in its 
generation.
This understanding is basic towards appreciating the 
essence of extending .jur isdiction over fishery resources to 
coastal states which were then expected to manage them in a 
manner which is to ensure efficiency of exploitation. If 
under "open access" these resources could be not be managed 
effectively it would follow that under national Jurisdiction 
the ills associated with over exploitation and disregard of 
conservatory needs would be minimized and thus enable 
cuuntries to keep retain the advantages of better managed 
resources. The reality though does not present such a simple 
alternative.
Pruffessur Pontecorvo makes one important observation of 
relevance to the Tanzanian approach in the pursuit of its 
economic interest in its fishery. He argues that the benefits 
for coastal from extended fisheries Jurisdiction are 
potentially considerable; that, they can however as easily 
disappear if the acquired resources are not accompanied with 
effective management «. Thus while Tanzania may have lended 
its support towards claims for an extended fishery 
Jurisdiction it remains very important for her to take the 
next step, cautiously and purposely, towards building up a 
system which would accord her the biological and economic 
knowledge of her resources.
This ability does not only have managerial implications 
but may also have far reaching effects. While article 62 
obligates a coastal state to ensure the optimum utilization 
of the resources by determining its capacity to harvest the 
same, it also provides that where its capability does not 
allow harvesting the TAG the surplus should be made available 
to foreign states. So access by foreign fleets may either be 
denied because the coastal state has the ability to harvest 
its TAG i_ir granted when that capability is not commensurate 
to the total allc>wable catch.
However what seems to be a shortcoming -in relation to 
the provision of article 62 is the fact that while it 
provides for a situation where a country is unable to exploit 
its allowable catch, it does not similarly provide for a 
situation where a country is unable to determine its TAG. 
While this would seem the essence upon which the other 
provisions of the article would effectively spring upon, it 
is only largely left to general provisions about Joint
cooperation in scientific research.
In the examination of any fishery management concepts 
however it would seem that the inevitable approach, like any 
other managerial approaches, must dwell and do with the 
identified objectives for which the particular concept to be 
applied is but a mere tool. This should be crucial because an 
analysis of any preferred managerial concept does n'ot seem to 
be without its detractors. Both economists and biologists are 
understood to be in contention about one approach against 
another. Fishery Economists Christy and Scott, and Biologists 
Larkin and Sissnwine are said to be critical of the relevan._e
of MSY as a management objective ■*.
And yet fishery management is inevitable. Managerial 
concepts are only tools of application for preferred results 
or objectives. It must be realised that for Tanzania, and 
particularly for its artisanal fishery, the need for fishery 
management arises from the fact that, the fishing effurt 
would otherwise continue to increase until a point where, at 
least, there is no economic yield remaining in the fishery.
In response to this, fishermen will decrease in numbers as 
return and stock diminishes, which may Just be what happened 
to the artisanal sector in 1981. (. Table 1 .
Troadec (1983) explains this relationship or consequence 
vividly. When fishing effort increases in any fishery, 
artisanal or industrial, the immediate result is a 
corresponding increase on total catches. . However this 
increase steadily slows down, that is, increasing though at a 
decreasing rate. At some point along the curve, the maximum
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level is reached (MSY) subsequent to which any further effort 
.results in fairly decreasing catches.
Keen, in a chapter titled the "Strange Productivity 
Curve" where he examines what has been called the "tragedy of 
the commons" observes that while 95X of world fisheries have 
been brought under national jurisdictions following the 198.^; 
Convention "the incentive to overfish and to fish wastefully, 
and the lack of incentives to invest to improve overall 
productivity of the resource, remain unchanged" *•*•*
In explaining the strangeness and tragedy associated 
with fisheries. Keen points out that unusually the law of 
supply and demand does not work well with fishery resources 
hence the peculiar need for their management . While price 
has a significant influence it does not always hold true, for 
fishery resources, that the higher the price the larger the 
quantity supplied . This axiom is valid though only up to a 
point.
The oddity in the fishery situation is while demand, and 
thus prices, increases the number of fishermen and the need 
to increase effort sci as to increase supply and be able to 
reap profits associated with the increase in demand. However 
because the increase in effort alone does not have a bearing 
or influence on the biological reproduction of the stock, 
soon any stock becomes a victim of overexploitation. At this 
point, when the resource is diminishing , the tragedy settles 
in. The increase on price does not then result in increased 
supply but in lesser and lesser supplies.
What therefore becomes critical here for any fishery 
resource is that at the point where there begins to be a 
negative relationship between demand and supply, losers in 
this undertaking become identifiable. Because diminishing 
supply is occasioned by a corresponding depletion of the 
resource, the immediate victim thus becomes the stock. And 
when the stock suffers there is no running away from the fact 
that all segments of the socio- economic fabric related or
dependant to a healthy stock equally suffer the consequences 
of this damage.
It becomes increasingly important therefore that even 
for a country like Tanzania where in some areas it is 
believed that the problem lies, not in decreasing effort but 
in increasing the fishing effort. Quality or strategic 
management would inevitably demand, even in sui_h 
circumstances, an awareness of the extent to which effort may 
be increased without exceeding the point where such effort is 
assumed at the expense of the stock.
In view of the fact that the stock is the target in any 
fishery, it therefore invariably follows that when the stock 
suffers so do the management objectives related to the
sector. Here, therefore is another reason calling for caution 
even in setting objectives. Too often the government has 
placed emphasis on promoting the growth of those involved in 
fishing seemingly as a way of curtailing unemployment whi'_h 
is relatively high in coastal areas, and more so because
artisanal fishing is a sector that can still employ many 
without the need for formal education or training.
However, without having the capacity to determine the 
fLtence c*f varic'us factc>rs, natural c>r those caused by an 
increase of the pc>pulatic'n c>f fishermen, assuming it 
increases effort, the policy may ultimately have a negative 
consequence on the resource. This may be unknown to the
administration which cciuld very possibly have taken the
decision in good faith. Indeed some economists have rightly 
cautioned in some fishery situations, especially where effort 
is at MSY, the objective of maximizing employment and the 
improvement of average individual income may be in direct 
conflict, Troadec 19S3.
^ The caution here is that a lot of measures undertaken in 
good faith may actually be militating against the very 
objective they are taken up for. That, without some semblani_e 
of basic information used to rationalize measures taken by 
any administration, any purported management is at best a
game of chance. At the root of all formulas and dynamics 
associated with fishery management is the simple truth that 
management is only effective when supported by a conceptual 
understanding of the biological and economic setting upon 
which the fishery operates. Unavoidably, this is as true to 
artisanal as is to the industrial fishing.
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2.2 Resource Implications.
"Until now the catches are much lower than 
the projected catches but we hope to find 
out soon whether these low catches are 
due to technical problems or will 
possibly be the maximum catches we can 
get from our sardine stock"ZAFICO 
Acting General Manager.
The preceding section has underlined the fact that no 
appropriate management approaches to'the exploitation of any 
fishery resource can possibly be successful without having 
information necessary for such management. For Tanzania it 
has revealed the importance of taking the next step beyond 
the mere assumption of an extended maritime Jurisdiction 
which alone cannot solve neither the exploitational nor 
developmental problems associated with fishing. It cannot 
guarantee neither the effective utilization of these 
resources nor the attainment of her objective both for the 
short and long term.
And yet all too oftejn, fishery statistics are generally 
not readily available and often unreliable that they are not 
put to any use. This has often resulted in a dilemma such as 
facing the management of ZAFICD both in terms of the 
interpretation of a situation which is undoubtedly very 
critical to a relative huge investment made by the 
Government.
The problem facing the management of ZAFICO is a typical 
reflection of the various constraints facing fishery 
administrators in the country. The problem has two facets 
both relating to resources. Because Zanzibar town is a large 
consumer market for sardines which constitutes an important
part of the populations dietary intake, the Government, 
through ZAFICO - a public corporation, undertook to increase 
its catch capacity by supporting its purchase of an 
additional fleet hoping this would work to satisfy the demand 
for fish in Zanzibar. Regrettably this was not easily 
attainable due to a number of reasons but mostly due to some
technical difficulties with the boats , and , the fact that
catches were just not enough. This highlights the first
problem; uncertainties or outright lac k of in for mat ion
pertaining to the target stock.
The second problem has to do with the governments
willingness to allocate not only financial resources but
human resources as well as to assist in setting up a basic 
system which would enable it to have at least an indicative 
basis upon which it can rest its decisions and actions. It 
would seem rather naive to set aside funds for six meter
boats and one twelve meter without the support of reliable 
information as regards their ability to operate economically 
both in terms of their cost and the resource available. It 
was therefore no coincidence that following the reported 
decrease in fish catches in Zanzibar, the Government 
instituted in 1989 a development plan to alleviate the
decline in total annual fish landings. The suggested plan
included an initial injection of foreign currency to enable 
the importation of sufficient gear. The presumption was that 
the decline was occasioned by insufficiency of gear which is 
not supported by the fact that even thcise fishermen with 
relative adequate gear continued to report declining catches.
But governments are known to act with speed when what is 
at stake is of political expediency. It would be convenient 
for the government to supply a boat which can land sardines 
that are of immediate attention to the local population 
rather than direct these funds or part of the same for 
instituting a system which would enable it to reduce these 
uncertainties.
Indeed while there are too many competing demands for
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the resources available to a government for development 
purposes, choices need be made and priorities spelled out. 
For Tanzania, the government has repeatedly made claims about 
the importance of its fishery resources to its economic 
development goals but the existing infrastructure does not
seem to support these claims.
Therefore while Tanzania has- had a long claim to fishery 
management, at least in its broadest sense, there has been 
until recently, following a growing appreciation of the
"tragedy of the commons", few cases of a dialogue between
scientists, administrators and fishermen aimed at reaching a
consensus at management measures.
Consequently, the general situation has been one of a 
well meaning administration imposing "management on a 
fishery but frequently without any real knowledge of the 
implication to the* fishermen, the industry or to the
r esour c es.This apparent dilemma facing the' government and
particularly fisheries administrators serves to question the 
extent to which administrators have had an influence in the 
formulation of government policies. It is easier to have the 
best intentions without having an action plan intended to 
break out of the immediate confines posed by this problem. 
Indeed the -real issue is that, most often it is felt that it 
would be costly and time consuming to invest time and money 
in preparatory programs. The drive to attend to a pressing
problem seems to override the need to establish the necessary
i n f r ast r uc t ur e.
Of essence here is the fact that while data or the 
availability of information about the resources to be 
exploited should not be seen, nor is it being suggested, as 
being the only single important element in the management of 
the Tanzanian fishery, it nevertheless cannot be neglected 
given that developments that have taken place in the last 
thirty years indicate that the fishery sector has developed 
about as far as it can under existing pattern of
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iexploitation.
For the required optimum development of this sector and 
the attainment of desired national goals - higher catches for 
food, foreign exchange and more jobs, a more serious re­
examination of the existing pattern of exploitation cannot be 
avoided. This also calls into question the role of leadership 
in sensitiaing the government against the natural tendency to 
react to what is seen as politically expedient. It takes 
leadership to sensitize the fact that too often the best 
intentions remain unfulfilled when decisions are subjected to 
chance.
It also takes leadership to present politicians with 
equally viable alternatives which may possibly be attractive 
to them and to the national developmental goals. For 
instance, there is no credible excuse as to why for thirty 
years after independence, a period which the artisanal sector 
has seen great expansion in numbers of participants and 
activity, fish marketing remains largely a beach operation. 
One would have expected here to find a window of opportunity 
which, under proper circumstances, should be of attraction to 
politicians while at the same time giving innovative options 
for expanding the fishery markets beyond the beach and in the 
process assist in the growth and productivity of the 
artisanal sector.
Of significance here is the fact that the constraints 
within which the fishery sector has been operating must be 
seen as part of the inevitable challenges in any fishery. 
What is different though is the manner administrations and 
governments respond to these challenges. Winners can only be 
amongst those with administrators or leaders with the 
necessary skills and conviction to bring to bear upon those 
who prioritize national objectives. This can be critical 
given that success can hinge on this aspect.
In a study about the north-west African countries it was 
observed that the adoption of inadequate balances of basic 
inputs (manpower, capital, energy) could only add up to
3e
production and processing costs already taxed by the 
inefficiencies of underdevelopment.*-'* To an artisanal sector 
this imbalance could dramatically contribute towards its 
failure to expand beyond its limited confines.
In a broad sense, the challenges facing the Zanzibar 
administration are only representative of the general 
situation in the country. In the face of so many challenges 
fishery administrators often seem overwhelmed and torn 
between the realization of the need for a workable framework 
of fishery management on one hand, and the pressures brought 
upon them both by the economic demands of the coastal 
populations and the political interests associated with these 
populations on the other.
In " Fishery Statistics: What we need to know"
Pontecorvo*-® makes a strong argument that statistics are 
essentially of relevance and benefit to all the users who he 
considers to be fishery biologists, economists, regulators, 
fishermen, commercial interests and the stock itself. It is 
for the interest of all the users that statistical
information plays a key role in eliminating uncertainties 
associated with the availability of the ocean resource 
targeted for exploitation. The important link for Tanzanian 
administrators seems therefore to lie at the point where even 
politicians and the fishermen themselves are made to respond 
to the relevance of information based activities and 
decisions. They have to see the use both as resource 
exploiters and as policy makers.
It has therefore, on this regard been easier to discern 
two principal shortfalls that largely impact upon the fishery 
resources of Tanzania. One, which represents a national 
problem as localized by the Zanzibar's sighted experience is 
that while lack of funds is one of the constraints, of more 
importance is the fact that information is needed on the 
extent and amount of fish that is available and of interest 
to the local population or fleet. Two, is the fact that all 
along the coast access is granted to almost every one and.
there is no Vaiowing the extent to which the fishery resources 
can stand the pressure or to what extent this pattern of 
fishing activities could be a contributory cause to the 
claimed declines in seasonal fish landings. As observed 
earlier, the unreliability of the data that is available does 
not lend itself to significant use.
And yet while managing the living resources of any 
ocean has not been easy and indeed even difficult in the 
best of conditions, what may be termed as successful does not 
often lie in attaining higher catches but only in achieving, 
on a balance, a greater degree of realisation of the 
objectives the administrat ion or regulatory regime set for 
itself. This, to me, seems a more credible yardstick in 
assessing the effectiveness of • both policy and
implementation. It is further more realistic in that it would 
not be appropriate to analyze performance of the Tanzanian 
fishery sector in the light of management goals set for , say 
the EEC. For one, even the EEC is not doing any better,and 
for another, more important reason is that resources may 
differ immensely from one area to another in as much as there 
may be wide variations relating to the socio-economic needs 
of any given fishery sector.
There? is however a very serious and urgent need to break 
the cyclic circle of underdevelopment in which the Tanzanian 
fishery finds itself. Fishery resources cannot be proper*ly 
managed because of lack of infrastructure (efficient 
gear, data etc). The infrastructure cannot be established for 
lack of financial resources and, financial resources are 
unavailable because the resource output is not sufficient to 
support such an investment!! The argument goes on and on.
There are two ways of ending this cyclic reasoning. One 
is apocalyptic and the other is based on appeal to reason and 
understanding. The former relies on the inevitability of 
having to face up to the situation following the inevitable 
collapse of the fishery resources due to increased and 
unregulated fishing. The latter appeals to the not so
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uncommon realisation of both the artisanal and industrial 
fishermen that when exposed to overfishing resources are 
depleted and, consequently that a mechanism for monitoring 
this process and relationship between their activities and 
the state of the stock is of interest to all concerned.
As Tanzania prepares to open itself to extensive foreign
investment following the new Investment Promotion and
Protection Act, 1990, and after decades of officially shying 
away from actively promoting such course of action, the 
dilemma facing its fishery resource management 
correspondingly increases. If within the existing managerial 
constraints it has been difficult to have a reliable
indication of the state of the fishery on the inshore areas 
for species of interest to the artisanal sector, what 
benefits will a foreign fleet operating on the inshore 
grounds and targeting shrimps bring to an already over 
whelmed managerial regime.
While the potential benefits for secondary industries 
and the possibility to earn much needed foreign currency must 
not be lost sight of, it is also critical that the reswurue 
should not be left to suffer at the hands of what may only 
clearly be short term interests. And yet, the long term 
interest can only be adequately taken into account and 
protected by ensuring that this expansion does not destroy 
the necessary balance allowing for sustaxinabil ity. And this 
can only be realized when thcere is sufficient knuwledge of 
the relevant factorsj namely, the state of the resource, the 
level at which it can sustain exploitation and the general 
factors its biological reproduction.
This bio-economic approach, as observed earlier, does 
not have to be comprehensive. It has to be useful though. It 
has to be able to address the policy goals for the sector 
while protecting the resource. This can often be achieved 
through the systematic collection of data pertaining to 
species of interest. What is needed is leadership and 
det er m i nat i C'n to explore and adopt new approaches tc> fishery
41
management. To re-order the priorities so as to 
protect the resources and to ensure regulated 
which would neither compromise the short and, 
the long term interests, of the fishermen, the 
the resource.
conserve and 
exploitation 
particularly 
industry and
2.3. Strategies for Adoption.
In the management of fishery resources there has been 
varying concerns depending on the importance of the resouri.es 
themselves as either a source of food or the backbone of 
economic activities. However, implied in any of the 
managerial approaches which countries or administration have 
sought to impose on efforts aimed at the exploitat i'on ‘of 
these res‘i.urces is the realization that the resources are n-ot 
1imitless.
In this context, in most of the managerial concepts 
underlying fishery exploitation is an awareness that, because 
of their - natural and biC‘logical characteristics, fish output 
is limited. That, sustainability can only be maintained if 
expl‘Ziitat iiiin is kept within certain reasonable limits. This 
reality is also associated with aniother. That, fishermen, 
left till themselves will always increase fishing effiort f'or 
expeizted additi'Zinal cat>zhes as 1‘Z‘ng as the fishery ‘.an 
priZ'fitably retain this increased activity. But unfortunately 
there is a tragedy relating to this pattern of development. 
Sooner or later but certainly at some point in time, the 
res‘Ource are depleted and b.:.th the fishing community and 
industry left t‘Z‘ suffer the c>Z'nsegueni_es.
For Tanzania a country with a predominantly artisanal 
fisheries sector special attention need be undertaken in 
respect of the development which may inadvertently lead to 
the ciZ‘l lapse of the fishery res>Z‘urces. Special attention need 
to be taken because of the fragility of the artisanal sector. 
Unlike the industrial se‘zt‘Z'r whi‘zh has its ‘_‘wn peculiar 
constraints, the artisanal sectior in Tanzania is 
characterized by low or lack of savings. The fact that it is 
essentially a hand to m.:.uth activity exposes it to severe 
shiDcks affecting a way of life f‘or many of the coastal 
popul at iizins.
The problem presented by this fragility can have huge 
cost to the nation in terms 'Z‘f losses attributable -to the
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waste generated by the inefficiency of the sector and the 
support the government may be called to extend to a segment 
of the population left in abject poverty.
Siven therefore that there must be a meaningful strategy 
aimed at protecting the resource and the fishermen, the 
responsibility lies with the government to evaluate and adopt 
an approach or approaches- which, bearing in mind the dynamics 
of the resource, would encourage the development of the 
sector and thus granting to the coastal population the 
stability and security that they presently do not have.
With the above concern in mind, it thus becomes 
apparent, as observed in the preceding section, that for 
managerial purposes certain basic information need be 
available if the objectives the administration set for 
itself are to have any scientific basis for Justification and 
evaluation. To an artisanal fishery sector such as Tanzania's 
this poses far more challenges due to the remoteness of the 
fishing communities. But given that you invariably have some 
form of government village administration reaching far into 
these remote communit ies, it should be possible through publi'. 
education, to enlist the cooperation of the villages and 
their fishermen in building a base of information which would 
assist in the determination or at least give an indication of 
the state of the fishery and therefore the management regime 
which may be instituted for a given locality or region. This 
should be a basic strategy and is equally fundamental to what 
Professor Anderson identifies as a first step in the 
management process where the establishment of the size of the 
stock and the fleet, the relationship between and amongst 
certain variables affecting the stock are key to the pro>_ess 
of developing fishery management pol icy.
The caution that need to be made here again has to do 
with an approach to statistical data with a passion. Even in 
developed economies where research funding cannot, in 
relative terms, be assumed as lacking, it -did take years and 
even decades, to collect and analyze the data coming from the
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fishing grounds enabling those country to obtain knowledge 
about the availability of species, their behavior, the effect 
of climatic and oceanographic changes to the stock and thus 
predict the dynamics involved in the growth and exploitation 
of the resource.
Indeed the crucial distinction here for any attempt to 
regulate the exploitation of the fishery resources in 
Tanzanian waters may rest in what Francis Christy, Jr, in a 
commentary response to Pontecorvo's "Fishery Statistics: What 
we need to know" suggests as being critical in the management 
and regulation of fisheries.*’® Without dismissing the 
relevance of Pontercovo"s approach he argues that the 
question is not so much about "what statistics at what cost 
and for what set of end users" but more in substituting users 
for uses which, he, I believe correctly, submits, gives a 
different perspective. That as users statistics are not 
required for their own sake rather they are intended as tools 
to attain certain objectives ~ uses. It is therefore these 
"uses" that are important to identify and thus enable us to 
define the information we urgently require.
The essence of Christy's approach is the fact that it 
gives a rather simplified approach to the search of useful 
data for management decisions. This is more adaptable to an 
artisanal fishery where, given the ge?ner al skills and 
education of the sector, simplicity could be the greatest 
virtue. Because having identified managerial objectives the 
emphasis moves to ascertaining the sort of data or 
information which is needed to influence or attain those 
objectives. Consequently, to the local fishing community it 
will not be burdened with attempts to dwelling the provision 
of information far removed the relevance of their engagement 
and spanning beyond what they would see and appreciate as 
being a key element in the conservation of a resource they 
too have an interest in.
What cannot be over emphasized in relation to importance 
of appropriate knowledge of the fishery resource is that what
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is at risk is not only the interest of the local communities 
but of the government too. At the time when the Tanzanian 
government is pushing for Joint ventures, it is undeniable 
that if preparatory data is not enough to provide reliable 
information on stocks of interest to the venture, it would be 
militating against the governments interest. Consequently 
knowledge about the , resource becomes of , strategic 
significance to the governments developmental objectives as 
wel 1.
Because the fishermen is central to this process of 
building up the necessary information base for the fishery 
resources management, it would therefore appear as critical 
that their support be obtained. While it is obvious that it 
would be easier having them working with the administration 
rather than against, it nevertheless is evidently clear that 
such is not often the case. While this may very well be a 
general phenomena within fishing communities, as equally 
proven by fishermen in Boulogne - France and, Penzance in the 
Western District of England during field visits, the 
prevalence sense of mistrust poses a gap that needs to be 
bridged if administrators are to be seen as responding to 
concerns that are not only of relevance to them as managers 
but to the fishermen as the immediate beneficiaries of these 
resources in the short as well as in the long run.
While fishermen are known of having their own strong 
opinion about how things need be done, they are equally too 
willing to identify and express their sympathy to measures 
aimed at conserving resources but which do not impinge on 
their efforts. This may be contradictory but it sure opens an 
area of common agreement from where a working relationship 
can be established. This, for the fishermen of Penzance and 
Boulogne appears to have been attained through the 
establishment and operations of fishermen cooperatives and 
associations.
In a largely artisanal setting such as Tanzanians the 
relationship between those who seek to manage the resources
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and those who exploit them can hardly be fruitful if the 
administration does not appear to be working for the interest 
of the fishermen. Here, public education can be another 
critical element. In Tanzania the government does not have 
the leverage which administrations in countries such as 
England and France have in relation to influencing 
availability of credit and the enforcement of its policy 
measures. The good will of those that are managed becomes a 
very important aspect if success is to be achieved.
And yet, while too c>ften the administration has made 
numerous efforts to convene forums by way of workshops and 
seminars amongst its officials and employees aimed at 
designing and implementing administrative measures for
regulating and control of the country fishery sector, this 
has not been matched by an undertaking to "educate" the
fishermen about the relevance of these administrative 
measures and the interest they are intended to protect. Too 
often these fishermen and their communities are merely 
subjected to demands of compliance to measures most of them 
can hardly relate to. Why should one have to report data 
about his own catches or landings? It may seem simple and 
logical but it shouldn't be taken for granted that the 
fishermen sees it the way we do. It is not unusual to find 
beliefs in coastal communities about the inexhaustibility of 
the living resources of the sea. It has to be proved that
this is not necessarily so.
Consequently, fishermen will continue to see managerial 
efforts as basically interventionistic and seeking to control 
and limit their rights and privileges on the pretext of
public good as long as there continues to exist mistrust 
between the two. There is a lot that the fishermen has to 
learn but there is equally a great deal that managers have to 
learn as well in terms of the delivery of their message.
On a different level, the significance of bridging the 
gap between managers and the managed ties in with the 
importance expressed earlier about the .simplicity and
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relevance of the data or information which managers must seek 
particularly those as in Tanzania who have to develop an 
extensive small scale fishing industry. The warning here is 
that managers need approach with caution managerial concepts 
which have often been researched for application to developed 
countries fishery, essentially industrial and, which may be 
facing entirely different constraints in terms of 
oceanography, biology and socio-economic demands.
While no argument is made for the disregard of available 
scientific approaches tested elsewhere, it is nevertheless 
important that Tanzania should be aware of the limitations 
presented by these advances in as much as even in those 
countries where there has been years of investment in such 
research, and ultimately practical theories, the often 
alleged exactness of such science should only be proof of the 
caution that must be observed.
What Tanzania must learn and appreciate from the 
experiences of developed fishing nations is the fact that 
rational fisheries management strategies must contend with 
socio-economic factors that influence the exploitation of the 
marine resources. That, the contex;t on which strategies are 
adopted must not loose focus, and relevance, of the intrinsic 
relationships upon which they are to operate and attain their 
intended objectives. Ultimately, the experiences of countries 
such as Indonesia and Philippines where specific public 
relations programs intended to raise national consciousness 
for implementing new ocean management strategies can play a 
constructive role in this endeavour.
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3.1 The Organization and its Constraints.
This section takes the view that management 
policies for national fisheries are inseparable from the 
broader question of national fisheries administration and 
development. It is submitted that the organization is Just as 
critical and at times the only factor which may determine the 
influence and success of desired management policies. 
Secondly it is also argued that the organization need be 
structured so as to be and act as. a tool of response to what 
may constitute national objectives the attainment of which it 
would be entrusted with.
With these two factors in mind it therefore becomes a 
surprize that while there has been numerous efforts towards 
•the improvement of Tanzanian fisheries, there has also, on 
the other hand, been a clear absence of an undertaking to 
examine the degree to which the very organization within 
which these efforts have been attempted could itself be a 
hindrance. This disposition is partly due to the belief about 
the resilience of government bodies, the trust .or myth about 
their capabilities of being adoptive on. the face of evolving 
challenges during the process of development.
The fact that Tanzania, unlike most other African 
countries, is having a unique form of government places an 
unusual significance on the form and nature of the 
organization the government selects as a vehicle of 
discharging its policies and realizing its developmental 
objectives. A unique government in that it is a product of 
the union, in 1964, between the former Tanganyika and 
Zanzibar governments resulting into the United Republic of 
Tanzania.
This Union however retained a sovereign government for 
Zanzibar with Jurisdiction on matters other than those 
pertaining to finance, defense, foreign affairs, 
telecommunication and higher education which were reserved to 
the union or central government. One of the criticisms 
against this government structure has been that while 
Zanzibar retained a government cif its own, Tanganyika on the 
other hand, did not. Consequently, the Union government is 
seen as being a government both for the union and what 
formerly used to be Tanganyika.
The dilemma that this government formation poses is 
particularly serious in relation to marine fishery resources 
and their management. While the conclusion of the 1982 UN Law 
of the Sea Convention may have at least provided a modus 
operand! upon which questions about authority and 
Jurisdiction between and amongst states could be resolved; 
for Tanzania, the implication arising from this duality of 
government were not only bureaucratic but political as well. 
The later may explain why this problem has not received 
adequate attention in the hope that at some day the 
politicians will come to grips with the constraining 
situation presented by the existing balance of power.
Given that matters relating to natural resources and 
agriculture within which fisheries has been associated are 
not prescribed by the constitution as a subject of the Union, 
there has been a plethorz^ of laws and regulations pertaining 
to fisheries emanating from the two parliaments and their 
respective administrative organs. It has also been a source 
of friction or misunderstandings particularly by the 
Zanzibaris who fear encroachment upon their authority by the 
mainland authorities.
While it may be a relative easier question to determine 
with regard to Jurisdiction in that the Union Government has 
authority for fisheries matters over Mainland Tanzania and
therefore that the Isles Government would have exclusive 
Jurisdiction in Zanzibar and Pemba, the-problem does not lend 
itself to such simplicity when, it comes to. defining the 
extent of the respective jurisdictions over the sea. While 
regional land boundaries are- clearly defined amongst 
provinces the Zanzibaris have at times felt that the boundary 
should not be taken in similar fashion, that is, as a 
regional administrative line but rather more as a territorial 
line.
If there has been any muted dissatisfaction with the two 
governments it has been more out of the realization that the 
artisanal fishermen from both the Mainland and the Isles have 
more in common then they have disagreements. Any demands 
about designated territories would similarly require a 
prescription of the privileges and duties which these 
fishermen must enjoy. This would also lead to demands fur 
further regulatory and enforcement activities. In any event, 
the problem here, as noted earlier, is more political than
anything else.
However, even within the two territories themselves, the 
existing set-ups have their own internal constraints. For the 
Mainland, the Fisheries Division in the Ministry of Natural 
Resources, Tourism and Environment has the primary 
responsibility in advising the Government, the regional and 
district authorities on fisheries development, management and 
the execution of fisheries development policy.
This executory role of the Fisheries Division is in 
itself hampered by the fact that at the regional and district 
level both the fresh water and’ marine resources fisheries 
officers are answerable to the Regional/District Develupment 
Directors CRDD/DDD) who are themselves ultimately answerable 
not to the Ministry responsible for Natural Resources 
(fisheries) but to the Ministry of Local Government and 
Cooperatives.
The rationality for this apparent anomaly is Justified 
in the economies of scale provided by the RDD/DDD acting as a
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multi-sectoral coordinators for the broad government 
interests in their respective regions. This has resulted in 
two shortcomings. The first is that in marine areas, and 
indeed even in shared fresh water bodies, there has been no 
established mechanisms for coordination of the management 
efforts. As a result it is not unusual to have different
districts and regions acting differently.
The second disadvantage stems from the dominant and even 
deciding influence of the RDD or DDD's in terms of channeling 
funds for development activities to competing priorities. 
Often, fisheries officers claim, fishery interest^i have 
suffered relegation in favor of other natural resource 
concerns, namely, forestry and wildlife. This has caused 
incidences whereby even funds which may have been
specifically allotted for fisheries development purposes are 
reallocated by the RDD/DDD to other sectors running out of 
their approved funding.
In essence the fact that field personnel are answerable 
to different governmental agencies or authorities presents a 
significant obstacle to the efficient administration of the 
Bovernment policies and development programs in the fisheries 
sector. Apart from the possibility funds risks being
reallocated to other 'areas, this situation also impedes the 
coordination and cooperation of fisheries staff at various 
levels. It also must diminish the effectiveness of the 
Fisheries Division in formulating and executing programs 
designed to develop its sectoral interests. While the Panning 
Commission was established to ensure the coordination and 
balance of development programs in relation to their 
formulation and execution, much is yet to be done especially 
when the role of the RDD’s remains as influential and as 
determinant when it comes to implementation and supervision.
The situation in Zanzibar is not much different either. 
There under the decentralization policy, the Fisheries 
Division of the Ministry of Marine, Forestry Resources and 
Tourism has little control over the deployment of field staff
and on the panning and impl ement^it ion of field programs. 
However, on the overall, staff at each level have
considerable independence in their respective, but mostly 
overlapping, areas of responsibilities. As a result, here 
too, coordination has proven difficult and generally 
inadequate.
.The fact that economic benefits from fisheries are not 
easily identifiable or that they would require some time to 
be so identifiable results in priority being directed towards 
areas which, be they in fishcery or anything else, exhibits 
immediate results rather than contributing to the longer term 
objectives in the context of well established programs 
This situation is exacerbated when the sectoral Division has 
little or no control on development funds or when needs and 
priorities reflected in programs are those seen and expected 
by Regional or District authorities without regard to the 
long term concerns of the fisheries sector.
All said though, fisheries as a sector has Just as 
suffered even from the hands of the central government 
itself. Perhaps nothing reveals the lopsided attention 
accorded the sector more than the budgetary support it has 
been able to secure in comparison with other natura1 resource 
sectors. For the financial year 19B7/88 of the total Tsh 468,' 
333,000 (about USf 5,535,000) allocated to the then Ministry 
of Lands Natural Resources and Tourism, Tsh 93,200,000 (about 
US$ 1 million) was approved for the Fisheries Division. This 
amount was to cover development and recurrent activities both 
for fresh water and marine fishery with the former taking a 
bigger chunk than the latter.
The disadvantage which the fishery sector suffers may 
also be attributable to the absence of experts with 
background in fisheries in the Planning Commission. The 
Commission which is in charge of coordinating the formulation 
and implementation of national development plans has a very 
important role 'in assigning priorities. It usually has a 
strong influence in the allocation of budgetary funds among
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other governmental agencies, as well as the establishment and 
use other financial or other kinds of resources, such as 
credit incentives, foreign assistance etc. Because its 
influence extends far beyond a single ministry it can 
influence the behavior of even RDD/DDD's who may be inclined 
to relocate funds approved for specific purposes.
The'Problem; As noted earlier, I am of the opinion that 
the limited extent to which fisheries management has had an 
impact in the development of the fisheries is occasioned by 
two main factors; structural and political. The fact that 
these have been so pervaxsive, and that they constitute 
obstacles to the formulation and execution of a fisheriees 
policy, reveals what could be seen as a contr aidict ion given 
the time and money that Tanzania spent in sending delegcxtiun 
to the UNCLOS III negotiations bent to protect her ocean
interests which included fisheries.
It also however reveals another contradiction which may 
perhaps be central to the problem posed by the structural 
limitations. This may be reflected by the fact that apart 
from fishing Tanzania does not have a strong maritime 
tradition. While she was engaged in the UNCLOS deliberations 
her principal interest was to secure sovereign rights over a 
vast offshore area. That existing institutions and national 
capabilities were either inadequate or non-existent in the 
context of her assuming responsibility for , and control of, 
this area was not a question of immediate significance.
Consequently on the attainment of the rights and duties 
granted by the 1982 Convention, Tanzania found herself 
without the necessary institutional arrangements for the 
development planning inherent in the conceptual framework of 
ocean resources such as fisheries. As a result, and in 
response to this partial realization, a broadening of the 
mandate of a number of national institutions concerned with 
marine affairs and an increase of some of the existing 
capabilities in terms of material -and manpower was attempted.
57
when what was indeed required was beyond a mere exercise in
broadening of institutional mandates.
As a' conerstone to this dilemma was the fact that
Tanzania did not have a commitment which could be said to
constitute its fishery or marine resources policy. For this
would have necessitated, with the right political support, 
the evaluation and examination of the adequacy of the system 
as it existed and its capabilities in terms of addressing
the governments policy objectives.
It has often been said that institutions are the
instruments with which to accomplish policy. What then is 
required in the beginning more than the institution itself is 
the definition of the goals and mechanisms which would ensure 
effective coordination at all levels in the pursuit '-'f 
desired policy. This approach is particularly more demanding 
and challenging for fisheries management. For many countries 
this obligation has been seen as daunting as it has been a 
challenge. Admittedly, the question must be: what are the
most effective ways of achieving national objectives at
least coast?.
for Tanzania the cost has been exorbitant. The problems 
posed by the duality of the two governments and the 
multiplicity of uncoordinated relationships regulating or 
controling one or some aspects related to fisheries can only 
generate waste both in human and financial terms.
Unfortunately there does not seem to be any light at the 
end of the tunnel. As recent as 1989, the adoption of ^the |
Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone Act which was 
heralded as ushering in a horizon has not helped matters 
either. In essence, the Act is an attempt to do two things: 
one, is to formally declare Tanzanias territorial sea of 1.^- 
nautical miles and her EEZ of 188 nautical miles as per the 
1982 Convention, and two, it is an effort to mandate to the 
Union Government some responsibilities relating to the 
management of ocean resources which were hitherto under the 
jurisdiction of ministries whose responsibilities were not
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reserved to the Union Government.
The question that arises here is the validity of an Act 
that clearly assigns to the Union responsibilities which the 
constitution did not. Here the trick is done by entrusting 
the administration of the Act to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs who as per section 19 may make regulations for 
carrying into effect the provisions of the Act, "and in 
particular respecting'
(a) any activity relating to the exploration or exploi­
tation of the Zone;
(bl any activity relating to the economic exploration 
or exploitation of the Zone;
Cc) the authorization, control and regulation of scie­
ntific research in the Zone;
Cd) the safety and protection of structures or devices 
in the Zone;
(e) the preservation of the marine environment of the 
United Republic and the prevention and control of 
pollution thereto;
(f) the regulation of the conduct of any person in or 
upon the Zone;
Cg) conservation measures to protect the living 
resources of the sea
The major .failing, apart from the declaratory 
significance, of this legislation is not only about the 
expertise and capability of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to discharge the mandate so assigned to it but the fact that 
the other principal legislations relating to fisheries such 
as the Fisheries Act 1970 and regulations made there under, 
1973, for Mainland Tanzania, and relevant legislations for 
the Isles, were not modified in line with the new legislation 
but were left to operate in tandem. Resulting in further 
discord and was only able to bring about a new horizon of 
uncertainty.
That there is an urgent need to rationalize government 
policies and its existing structures cannot be over
emphasised. That the success or benefits that the country and 
its people could obtain hinges more importantly on the 
development of appropriate national capabilities is 
undeniable. This demands two immediate measures: first, the 
assumption of the responsibility for the management of the 
marine areas by a national body entrusted with policy making 
and coordination; secondly, the development of national 
capabilities by rationalizing employment of skilled personnel 
currently under different authorities; and, thirdly, the 
recognition that the acceptance, through ratification, of the 
LOS Convention obliges the Government to undertake measures 
intended to implement the Convention. The TS and EEZ Act is 
but an umbrella which triggers demand for legislative changes 
elsewhere. An exhaustive review of all the legislation having 
a bearing on ocean management both for the Mainland and the 
Isles need, with urgency, to be undertaken.
This calls for a new approach. Whatever institutional 
form(s) is or are adopted , caution demands an evolutionary 
and adaptive strategy which strengthens and enhances the role 
played by the ministry responsible for fisheries development.
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3.2 Issues in National Fisheries.
In the preceding section and chapters an attempt was 
made to identify the implication for Tanzania stemming from 
her newly acquired maritime .jurisdiction. Evidently, while 
there are benefits to be gained, there are alsu 
responsibilities to be discharged. What is to be gained and 
the responsibilities the administration has assumed in terms 
of realizing these gains can best be analyzed in the context 
of the issues arising from what constitutes the countries 
marine fisheries policy.
It is nciteworthy to observe that until early ld3.w- the 
Government was still in the process of producing a fi_irmal 
document to constitute its National Fisheries Policy which is 
also proof of difficulties it has been facin'g in its efforts 
towards a rationalized management approach for the sector. 
This notwithstanding, one is able to construct through the 
current Five Year Plan, and recent annual ministerial budget 
speeches, what amounts to the goals and ob.jectives of the 
Government with regard to its fishery resources. These are 
identified as follows;
i) To increase fish production as a means of providing 
the much need animal protein at a reasonable pri'-e; _
i i ;> To ensure fishermen raise their income and standard 
of living;
iii) Tc> promote and consc'lidate fisheries training, 
research, statistical data collection and improve the 
administrative machinery of fisheries and related 
product ion institutions;
iv) To promote regional co-operation in working out a 
strategy for managing and exploiting fisheries 
resciurces which are shared with other states, 
v!) To promote and consolidate national capabilities tu 
exploit marine fisheries resources within our 
territory;
vi> To earn foreign exchange from the sale of surplus
&1
fish, Crustacea and other marine aquatic products; 
and^
vii) To consolidate the national policy of self reliance 
in the field of fishing, fish processing, 
preservation and marketing of fishery products.
It is indeed difficult, except for an obvious absence of 
a commitment to the protection of the marine environment, to 
fault the intentions of the Government in the context uf its 
needs for the exploitation and management of the fishery 
resources. These policy objectives, though, need to be seen 
more in terms of the structure of an industry which as 
observed in the preceding chapters essentially constibutes 
of: a'.) a large, mainly subsistence artisanal sector, where
the majority of the fishermen concentrate on the 
inshore waters using small boats; 
b) a small industrial sector concentrate on shrimp 
fishery on the inshore waters, with a further small 
part of which fish on the offshore waters for pelagic 
r esour c es;
ca resource base whose datci inadequacy and
unreliability constrains upon its rational 
exploitation, planning and development; and, 
d) a marketing and distribution system which inhibits 
the expansion c>f the industry.
The Objectives; The ideals expressed by the Government 
and the above setting upon which these ideals must operate 
present a formidable challenge which must be overcome if any 
qains are to be realised and enhanced. While these benefits 
depend ' on the development of the sector the challenge rests 
on the adoption of a strategy which has clear objectives that 
can be audited in relation to activity or inactivity. The 
last section highlighted the seriousness posed by the 
inadequacies in the institutional framework for the marine 
resource management.
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Thus if the Government is bent to "promote and 
consolidate national capabilities to exploit marine fisheries 
resources" the dual and multi-level structure of the 
fisheries administration stands out as one of the major 
issues acting as an impediment to the proper development and 
management of its fisheries resources. The present structure 
implies a piecemeal approach to the promotion and 
consolidation of policy goals and objectives, and therefore 
resulting in uncoordinated activities for lack of clear 
appraisal and overall responsibility in the execution and 
management measures on national fishery.
The most serious and practical limitation posed by this 
element is the fact that institutional weaknesses permeates 
the entire fabric upon which any meaningful capabilities 
could be developed. It inhibits planning capabilities if the 
Fisheries Division cannot determine and regulate the 
employment of fisheries staff at the regional and, district 
levels. More so it impedes the building of a reliable
statistical system given its reliance on different regional 
and district authorities having different priorities. The 
existing organizational structure has severely diluted the
authority of the Fisheries Division in attempting to 
establish a coordinated and integrated mechanism for planning 
and development so as to ensure that the sector contributes 
more efficiently towards both its sectoral and national 
objectives.
The Legal Framework; Attendant to problems associated 
with institutional limitations rise those that stem from the 
existing legislations. Here, again, while Tanzania took 
measures to formalize the declaration of her EEZ by the
enactment of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone 
Act of 1933, there has been no effort yet undertaken to 
review and rationalize existing legislations both for 
Tanzania Mainland and the Isles so as to provide an
appropriate legal basis for the country's fishery management 
regime.
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A case in point. For mainland Tansania, the Fisheries 
Act of 1970, with general regulations formulated in 1975 and 
1983, provides the framework for the operation and control of 
the fishery industry. But this Act essentially operates as a 
revenue gathering mechanism through the establishment of a 
system of licensing whose enforcement is yet another 
difficulty.
There is no greaiter proof about the emphasis (revenue!) 
of the fisheries Act, 1970, than an examination of what it 
regulates against what it does not. Because the artisanal 
fishery is rather small scale using limited technology, it 
does not seem to secure a high profile. Part II (Registration 
of Fishing Vessels) paragraph 3(2) of the Fisheries (General) 
Regulations 1973, provides that registration "shall apply to 
every vessel, other than dug-out canoes, however called or 
described, used for fishing purposes".
Given that artisanal fishing represents about 807. of 
Tanzanian marine catches, the exclusion of dug-out canoes 
from registration represents about 70X of the estimated 
ztrtisanal fleet on the mainland coast. Table 3.
Table 3.
Numbers of Artisanal Fishing Boats by Type and Region.
1986.
Bot^t Type Tana a Coast Bar. L i n d i Mtwar a Tot al s
Mtumbwi 180 177 033 343 167 0955
Ngalawa 334 390 172 013 1322
Nashua 174 193 169 035 163 0734
Eiot i 053 037 107 014 007 0218
Total 5 791 797 727 614 350 3279
Not e: Ntumbwi are dug-out canc:iBS of 2-4 meter 1ength
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canoespropelled by paddling, Ngalawa are dug-out 
with sails and fitted with outriggers for 
stability, Mashuas are planked boats of 5 - 10
meters in length fitted with sails, and bot i are 
motorized boats.
Source; Summary of Fisheries and Resource Information 
for Mainland Tanzania. L.B. Nhwani.
Furthermore, the scope of fishermen and fisheries 
subjected to licensing is severely restricted. Regulation 
13 Cl) provides that "No person shall engage in fishing or 
other dealing in any of the types of fish or fish products 
enumerated in Part B of the Third Schedule unless he is a 
holder of a valid licence" Part B of the Third Schedule lists 
the types of fish and fish products; namely, 1, Crustacea 
jL. Sea weed 3. Beche-der-mer 4. Sea Shells 5. Marine sport 
fishing 6. Trout sport fishing. Again, here e>:cluding a broad 
array of inshore species of interest to, and targeted by the 
artisanal fishermen.
What must be alarming in respect of the above specie 
exclusion is not so much about the 6?xclusion itself rather 
than the fact that it does not imply that the other species 
not subjected to licensing are considered in a state of 
abundance which can support unlicensed fishing. This is 
merely a reflection of the fact that these resources in the 
context of revenue to the treasury do not contribute a 
readily appreciable input; meaning the artisanal sector.
The above view is further consolidated by Regulation 
41 (1) which provides licence exemptions relating to methods
of fishing^ thus; "Notwithstanding anything contained in these 
regulations, no licence, permit or permission shall be 
required for fishing by any of the methods set out in the 
Fourth Schedule" And the Fourth Schedule, titled "Fishing 
Methods Exempted From Taking Out A Licence" lists the 
following;
65
1. Fishing for Prawns using-Kutanda Uduvi.
2'. Using rod and line or handline from the beach 
without using a fishing vessel whether for sport 
fishing, domestic consumption or sale, e.^cept in
a declared strout stream.
j X. not-c; — fc>r amusement >3. Small cast nets, seine nets
spot, domestic consumption or i.ommen-ial 
purposes.4. Cast nets, baskets, traps, gill nets when used 
without using a fishing vessel . - for domestic
c on sump tion or sale.
Of interest here is also the fact that while there is no 
doubt that most of the artisanal fishery can legally claim 
exclusion, the provisions could also be a source of 
confusion, consider, for instance, paragraph 3 of the Four• 
Schedule above. Because the regulations do not Sive a 
definition or specification for what could constitute "small 
and artisanal nets are generally small, a significant portion 
of this sector may be exempted from the regulatory regime 
established by the 1970 Act. Table 4.
The greatest flow with this legislative framework is 
that it does not encourage a resource management approach. It 
may encourage a management framework based on commercially 
exploitable resources but defeats the very foundation upon 
which management for sustainable development can be built. 
How do you determine catches by a fleet that is unregistered, 
unlicensed and above all that does not have any obligation to 
assist in the creation of a statistical data base" This cou 
also have avoided the use of special surveys which must be
• J +• c- relsvarvt informat iunundertaken now inorder to ._olle.-t reieva.
pertaining to the sector.
Table 4.
Number of Artisanal Gears by Type (1380)
Type Totals
Gill Nets BS42
Shark Gill Nets 3530
Beaxch Seines 1013
Cast Nets 216
Hand 1ines 13 478
Long Lines 121
Basket Traps 3 153
Fixed Traps 3 153
Unspecified Gears 453
Source: Statistics Section, Fisheries Division.
L.B. Nhwani.
The problem here may lie with what has been identified 
as a traditional negative character of legislative approach 
whereby legal provisions are more in terms of prohibitions 
and punishment; in terms of what ought not to be done rather 
than in encouraging what need be done - the developmental 
process of law.= Under the challenges brought about by the
£7
new law of the sea there is necessarily a need for a dynamic 
legal and administrative regime which would enable a coastal 
state not only to promote the optimum utilisation of the 
resources but to determine her allowable catch. This would 
hardly be attained within a legal and administrative regime 
which does not require all its fishermen to provide 
statistical information about their catches.
Nevertheless, even without legislative provisions
provides for a legal basis for the fisheries management 
planning, there is room within the broad mandate accorded to 
the sectoral Ministry to do just that. The Fisheries Act 
1S70, provides for the powers of the Minister, in this case 
the Minister for Natural Resources, Environment and 
Tourism, to make a wide range of regulations.
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3:3 Issues On Access By Foreign Fleets.
Tanzania's policy tciwards fishing in its waters by 
foreign fleets can, as pointed out in the last section, 
broadly be described as aimed at earning foreign from the 
sale of surplus fish, Crustacea and other marine acquatic 
products. The legal framework for this objective rests on 
Section 10 <1) of the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic 
Zone Act of 1989 CTS EEZ Act), which provides: "no person
shall within the Zone, except under or in accordance with an 
agreement with the gcivernment of the United Republic.
(a) explore or exploit any resources thereof;
Cb) carry out any search or excavation;
Cc) conduct any research;
(d) drill in or conduct, maintain or operate any 
structure or device; or.
' (e) carry out any economic activity."
In this connection Sub paragraph <2) provides that this 
section "shall not apply to fishing by a citizen of the 
United Republic or to a vessel registered in the United 
Repub1ic"
It was noted earlier that Tanzania's prime interest in 
extending her maritime jurisdiction was founded on the need 
to "keep foreign fishing vessels away". The enactment of the 
TS EEZ Act was therefore a significant response to the 
changes brought about by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention 
which appeared to enhance and protect what seemed as a 
fundamental interest in the ocean for Tanzania.
Underlying the need to keep foreign fishing vessels away 
were two basic reasons. One, that foreign fleets were 
exploiting resources over which it was believed the national 
fleet had priority and thus deserved protection from third 
parties, and, two, that if a third party was to get any 
benefits from these resources, it should only be possible 
after some fee was payable to the state. The question that 
arises therefore is what real benefits has Tanzania sei_ured
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or stand to obtain in the light of its obi ignition to manage 
and control the activities of the foreign fleet.
To* be sure, the TS S< EEZ Act has its own peculiar 
problems pertaining to fishing by foreign vessels which need 
mention before examinc^tion of what the country obtains by 
licensing foreign vessels. First, the Act is not specific on 
whether licensing foreign vessels applies both to the 
territorial sea - Part II , and the EEZ - Part III or only to 
the later. Part II < Territorial Seal Section (11 provides, 
"There is established a maritime zone to be known as the 
Territorial Sea", while Part III section 7 (11 provides,
"There is established contiguous to the territorial waters, a 
maritime zone to be known as the Exclusive Economic Zone". 
However, licensing provisions are only found under Part III 
and the provisions appearing thereunder repeatedly refer to 
the Zone with a capital Z and zone with an uncapitalized z, 
which may imply a difference between the "Zone" being the EEZ 
and the "zone" being the maritime zones established under 
sections 3(11 and 7(11.
In its preliminary provisions Part I section 2 
(Interpretation! the terms Zone or zone are not defined 
except that "Exclusive' Economic Zone" means the maritime zone 
described under section 7 of this Act. Which may also signify 
that the capital Z and z are only used inter changeabl y in 
Part III without any substantive difference in meaning. 
However, Section 12 (11 of Part III becomes more express in
relation to the zone while raising yet another different 
aspect. There it is provided that, "Any law relating to 
Fisheries, National Environment Management, Merchant 
Shipping, Petroleum and Mining shall apply in relation to the 
exploration of natural resources and the question of Marine 
pollution in the territorial and exclusive economic zone." 
Note the restrictive reference to exploration of natural 
resources and marine pollution. Does this exclude 
exploitation of the same? Does this signify a limitation of
applicability of those laws to the objects of section 10(11
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It howeverCa) as quoted above i.e "explore or exploit", 
clearly differentiates between the EEZ and the territorial
sea.
Secondly, because the Act maintains a distinction 
between local and foreign fishing vessels, as per section 10 
(1) and (2!) the definition of nationality becomes crucial as 
more strict conditions are imposed on foreign fishermen, 
relating to compliance, the licence fee levied and the level 
of penalty that can be imposed (fine not less than US$
100 000). The Act however gives nationality to a vessel on 
the basis of registration in the United Republic. There is nu 
requirement for the incorporation of the company under 
Tanzanian law as , a local company or the inclusion of a 
substantive local element.
The above nationality criteria therefore poses a numbejr 
of problems. One it makes it potentially easier for foreign 
to register in the country and thus to obtain benefits which 
are otherwise reserved for local vessels. And, two, it may 
even give rise to "flags of convenience" by - allowing 
nationals of third states to register in Tanzania in order to 
gain access into the fishing grounds in or around Tanzanian 
waters, or in areas otherwise denied the home flag.
Mcire impcirtant though, is the problem triggered by yet 
another agreement for which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is equally responsible. In an Exchange of Notes dated 17 
December 1375, and 9th July 1976, between Kenya and Tanzania 
respectively, resulting in a Maritime Boundary still valid to 
date, the two Governments agreed as per paragraph 3 thus;
3. Fishing and fisheries
(a) It was agreed that indigenous fishermen
from both countries engaged in fishing for 
subsistence, be permitted to fish within 12 
nautical miles of either side of the 
■ territorial sea boundary in accordance with 
existing regulations.
71
Cb) It was agreed that there be reciprocal 
recognition of fisheries licences, 
regulations and practices of either State 
applicable to indigenous fishermen 
aforesaid, fcir fishing within the area 
specified in paragraph 3 (a).
In essence therefore in the northern coast of Tanzania 
there is yet another group of players, the "indigenous" 
Kenyan fishermen operating under their Country's respective 
regulation and practices. While the term "indigenous" is not 
defined it seems- it was meant to discriminate against 
companies or entities that are either Kenyan or Tanzanian by 
mere registration or of minority holding by citizens of the 
two countries. This of course raises the problem of 
establishing the "genuine link" between the operator and the 
•-i-impany. It also raise a serious problem in terms of catch 
sbatistics and the control by the administration in whose 
territory the foreign "indigenous" fishermen is fishing due 
to. his being sub.jected to practices of his country of origin.
These shortcomings notwithstanding, the TS & EE2 Act 
stands as the principal legislation governing the activities 
of foreign fishing vessels in the EEZ. Section 19 of this Act 
empowers the Minister to make regulations giving effect to 
the provisions of the Act, and in particular respecting:
(a.) any activity relating to the e.vcpl c>r at ion or 
e.xploitation of the Zone?
<b.l any activity relating to the economic
e.v;ploration or exploitation of the Zone;
(c) the authorization, control and regulation of 
scientific research in the Zone;
(d'J the safety of structures and devices in the 
z o n G j
(e) the preservation of the marine environment of 
the United Republic and the preservation amd 
control of pollution thereto;
Cf) the regulation of the conduct of any person in
or upon the Zone; and,
(g) the conservation measures to protect the living 
resources of the sea.
Since no regulations have been promulgated under the 
Act, regulations formulated in 1973 under the Fisheries Act 
of 1970 are considered generally applicable though they were 
specifically made for the then existing territorial sea of 50 
nautical miles. They also do have general management 
principles which can prove adoptive to the managerial 
requirement of the new regime.
Access Arrangements: Lawrence Christy,* identifies three 
broad choices open to coastal states for foreign
participation in their fisheries; i) to prohibit or 
discourage any foreign participation, ii) to grant access to 
wholly foreign opesr at ions Cl ice^nsing j and, i i i :i to permit 
access only . in association with national partners (Joint 
ventures) or national operations Cover the side sales).
For Tanzania it can be observed that the government has 
taken to pursuing a mixture of both licensing and Joint 
ventures. And here one gets a revelation of the advantages 
or disadvantages that the Government has obtained. It should 
also be noted that there does not seem to be any clearly 
spelled out objectives in relation to foreign participation 
other than the overriding need for revenue in foreign 
exchange, and thus the implication on the local fishing 
industry do not seem to be a pressing subject, at least not 
in express terms. In this context an examination of the 
proposed agreement on fishing between Tanzania and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) dated March 1990, which W£is 
yet to enter into force as of February of 1992, may be 
appropriate.
The agreement is couched in its preambular articles by 
the now familiar contradiction enabling the EEC member states 
to individually denounce the Law of the Sea Convention but 
seek under the EEC umbrella to exploit its benefits, hence 
"recalling that the Community and Tanzania are signatories to
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the Law of the Sea". More importantly however ie that the 
agreement authorises, subject to a licence fee, Community 
fishing vessels to fish in Tanzania's fishing zone, because 
the agreement is principally concerned with fishing, it does 
not contain any specific management clauses other than an 
undertaking by the parties in Article 5 "to coordinate,
either directly or within international organizations, to 
ensure 'the management and conservation of the living
resources in the Indian ocean." And paragraph 5 of the Annex 
to the agreement boldly provides that "Community vessels 
shall have access to all of Tanzania's fishing zone
Indeed the EEC/Tanzania agreement provides a number of 
interesting aspects pertaining to fishery management. In a 
review of bilateral fishery agreements concluded as a result 
of the new reginrie of the oceans, Carroz and Savini makes a 
distinction in relation to the structure and duration of
access agreements. Some are known to be for a short term
and normally s€?l f contained, that is, comprehensive. While 
others are long term (four to five years) and merely provide 
a framework for cooperation and thus do not include detailed 
terms and conditions such as the level of fee to be paid, the 
number and size of vessels, areas of operations etc, which 
details become the subject of a different agreement or 
protocol. The EEC/Tanzania agreement is neither of the two 
but both. The agreement, valid for three years and renewable 
for another three has an Annex and a Protocol forming an 
integral part of the agreement. And what it does not have in 
common with the two categories above may constitute its major 
flow.
Article 1 of the agreement provides that its purpose is 
to establish the principles and rules which will in future 
govern, in all respects, the fishing activities of Community 
vessels in the Tanzanian fishing zone. Principles, may be, 
but as for rules there seems to be a lot that is left out in 
terms of relevant details if indeed it is to be relevant in 
all respects. For instance, the agreement under Article 6
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0p3,y loo£0ly provicJ0s 'fchcH't v00S0ls sui*thoyi20c! *b*-i fish shsll 
b0 obliQ0d to communicat0 to th0 Tanzanian authuriti0s 
stat0m0nts of catch without sstablishing a commitm0nt on th0 
part of th0 1ic0ns00 as to th0 mannsr and ths time when these 
reports should be submitted.
Curiously article 9 raises a very fundamental issue 
though one should not have expected it to have received a 
solution here. Sub-paragraph 3 thereof provides that, "any 
conservation measures taken by the Tanzanian authorities 
shall be based on objectisAe and scientific criteria.." That 
is, if Tanzania is to decide to take measures which may 
affect the activities of the Ccimmunities vessels Cart. 9cl)l. 
The false assumption here is that the decision to allow 
Community vessels in the first place was itself based on 
objective and scientific criteria which must be a fallacy. In 
any event, it underlines the importance of building up 
Tanzania's capability in resource assessment which is why a 
better catch repoting system ought to have devised or spelled 
out under the agreement.
And this brings to the fore yet another important 
consideration - the financial package accorded Tanzania. At 
this point it may suffice to say that Tanzania is able under 
the agreement to get scime "development aid" it needs frum the 
EEC. Eiut it increasingly becomes difficult to rationalize the 
value of what it obtains in relation to the resources the EEC 
is securing from the Tanzanian waters. Who benefits from who? 
It is easier to claim mutual benefits but as long as the 
agreement is based on values the question becomes 
unavoidable.
The Annex to the Agreement set a fee of 20 ECU per tonne 
of tuna caught within Tanzania's fishing zone with an advance 
of 1000 ECU per year (equivalent to 50 tonnes) for each 
licensed tuna seiner. For longliners a lumpsum of 200 ECU per 
year equivalent to the fee for 10 tonnes of tuna and other 
migratory species. While advance payments are nwt 
recoverable, for any additional tonnes caught in excess of
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obtain the
estimated yearly catches, Tanzania is to 
respective financial compensation provided in following 
terms: "The final statement of the fees due for the fishing 
year m respect of each vessel shall be drawn up by the 
Commission of the European Communities on the basis of the 
catch statements made by the shipowners, confirmed by the 
scientific institutes responsible for verification of catch 
figures (ORSTOM and the Spanish Oceanographic Institute). Any
additional payment due shall be paid by the shipowners within 
30 days.."
ne i_if the serious difficulties facing even fishery 
administrators even in developed countries is the flow of 
reliable statistical information. Too often log-books are 
neglected or misreporting rampant. Without an effective 
compliance and control' mechanism this will best remain 
wishful thinking espe^cially when for additional catches above 
the minimum the shipowner is equally called to make a 
payment. Further the fact that the additional payment will be 
based on catch statements submitted by shipowners there will 
be a tendency to workout log books so as to transfer any 
apparent excesses from one area to another so as to avoid 
having to bear the cost of any additional tonnage. The 
question is, what inc-entive is there for the shipowner to be 
too willing to work towards increasing his obligation. Indeed 
this also works to the advantage of the EEC. The more the 
shipowner works to avoid to pay for catches above the minimum 
the lesser the EEC would have to compensate Tanzania as per 
Article 2 of the Protocol.
Given Tanzania's limited control and surveillance 
capabilities, the control mechanism built into the agreement 
will most likely just remain useless. Paragraph 4 of the 
Annex requires vessels engaged in fishing in Tanianian waters 
to communicate their position every three days and also 
reporting posi’tion and volume of catch on board when entering 
and leaving the fishing grounds. Three days interval for a 
long liner which while following tuna is said to be able to
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travel 250 miles in 24 hours may enable an unscrupulous 
fishermen to enter and ultimately exit without having had to 
report anything.It would thus be interesting to see what, 
if any, compensation that Tanzania may obtain as a result of 
reported surplus catches beyond the initial estimated minimum 
catches.
The ■ protocol to the Fishing Agreement raises further 
important aspects in relation to the value Tanzania obtains 
for its resources. Article 2 gives a financial compensation 
of 1 050 000 ECU for three years to be paid in three equal 
instalments. F'aragraph 2 however provides that, that amount 
is to cover fishing activities up to a catch weight of 7000 
tonnes of tuna and other highly migratory species fished per 
year. If the annual amount caught is to exceed this quantity, 
compensation would be; made at the rate of 50 ECU per each 
additional tonne.
Now, it is important to examine the above provision in 
relation to the Agreement and place it in a proper context. 
First, the Protocol itself as per Article 1C11 provides that 
"Pursuant to Article 2 of the Ag^reement, and for a period of 
three years from the date of its entry into force, the 
following fishing possibilities shall be accorded;
“ for ocean going tuna seiners: Licences for 4& 
vessels.
- for surface longliners fishing for tuna and
other migratory species: Licences for 8 vessels" 
Article 2 of the Agreement under reference which has been 
cited before provides an advance payment of ECU 1000 as 
annual licence fee per vessel based on an estimate of 50 
tonne of tuna per vessel at 20 ECU per tonne. Assuming the 
EEC deploys 46 ocean going tuna seiners as per the Protocol, 
their total estimated annual catch would be 2300 tonnes; and, 
for the longliners 1600 tonnes for 8 vessels, for a total of 
3900 tonnes. And yet, the EEC as per Article 2 paragraph 2 
does not begin to compensate Tanzania until shipowners report 
catches in excess not of 3900 tonnes but 7000 tonnes, when
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again each additional tonne is compensated not at 20 ECU but 
SO ECU per tonne.
The argument here is that if compensation given to 
Tanzania of 1 050 000 ECU's is based on a notional minimum 
catch of 7000 tonnes, the very fact that this estimate is not 
based on any known objective and scientific criteria, chances 
are that it is working against the interests of Tanzania and 
that, the promised additional higher payments per tonne above
7000 will best remain a pie in the sky!
It also is true that Tanzania fails in this agreement to 
obtain the potential of her EEC partners for assistance in 
the development of her fishing industry either by way of 
processing or marketing its own pelagic or demersal catches. 
While other countries have been successful m this regard 
there does not seem to be any interest here other than the 
training opportunities and financial package offered.
Lastly it may be worthy noting the clear absence of any 
specification relating to vessel tonnage and possible 
differentiation in respect of licence fee, gear and me^h 
size. It would seem that the degree of influence which 
Tanzania may have over these very crucial aspects is very 
limited and largely confined to the discretionary authority 
of granting a licence which is subject to "Tanzania laws and 
regulations". This may raise even serious implications if the 
Communities request as per Article 1C2:) of the Protocol for 
"authorization for fishing possibilities for demersal and
Crustacea..." is to be granted.
Joint Ventures: Tanzania does not have a wide experience 
in joint ventures for fishing operations. Other than 
licensing some fishing operations, anything else resembling 
joint venture could be the marketing arrangement existing 
between the Tanzania Fisheries Corporation (TAFICO) and Taiyu 
of Japan whereby the later assists TAFICD to sell about 757. 
of its shrimp catches in Japan at ' an agreed price which is 
often below the market but accords TAFICO entry into a market 
it otherwise may not have been able to. In this arrangement.
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the Japanese command TAFICO’s large shrimp vessels and also 
oversee the processing of shrimps on board for the market.
However the enactment of the National Investment 
(Promotion and Protections Act £ 10 of 1990, heralds in a new 
era for foreign investment into Tanzania. Hitherto government 
policy towards .joint ventures was only lukewarm, if not 
resentful. The Act spells out a change of heart and 
signalling new enthusiasm. Of the areas identified as 
"priority areas for investment" are IS Agriculture and 
Livestock Development 2S Natural Resources 3S Tourism and 4S 
Manufacturing Industries, Fish Processing and Canning, and, 
Fish Nets.
In this context whether an applicant, that is, an 
interested foreign investor, is to be granted approval, the 
litmus test as per section 13(1S is "the likely contribution 
by the enterprise to the econcimic development and benefit of 
Tanzania, in particular, with respect to the following 
ob.ject ives: -
(a i
(bS
(c S 
(dS
<eS
<f S
the maximization of foreign exchange earnings 
and savings;
the enhancement of import substitution
activities which achieve identifiable 
substantial foreign exchange savings; 
the expansion of food production; 
the achievement of a high degree of technology 
tr ansfer;
the creation of employment opportunities and 
the development of human resources; 
the efficient utilization, expansion and
diversification of the productive capacity of
existing enterprises;
(g) the provision of services or the production of 
goods which improve linkages between the 
various sectors of the economy."
Given the limited experience in this regard for Tanzania 
fisheries, and given the new thrust towards encouraging .joint
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ventures which evidently includes the fishery sector, 
implication for Tanzania are considered further in the 
chapter in the context of regional approaches in 
management and development of regional fishery resources
the
next
the
SO
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4.1. The Setting.
Tanzania is part of a group of countries comprising 
the West Indian Ocean, an area classified as region number 
51 for international fishery statistics.^ For a number of 
reasons, especially absence of a wide continental margin 
which are characteristically known for nutrients and the lack 
of a strong upwelling current - also a good source of 
nutrients,® the West Indian Ocean is not therefore a 
particularly productive zone. However, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization <FAO) classsifies the general state 
of the exploitation of the area as being "mostly moderately 
to fairly heavily exploited"® indicating potential 
possibilities for further exploitation but within a strong 
framework of management to avert too heavy a pressure on the 
resource which may result in a collapse of the fishery.
Following the generalized extension of exclusive 
economic•zones to 200 miles by most of the coastal states, 
FAQ, in a desire to help the coastal states manage in a 
coordinated manner the exploitation of their ocean resources, 
assisted in the formation of a regional body - the Indian 
Ocean Fishery Commission CIDFC) which does not seem to have 
had much success aipparently due to its large size (area 51 
and 57), and the failure to respond to the immediate needs of 
coastal states for technical help and coordination.
In 1980 "sub-regional" committees of the lOFC were 
established amongst which was the South West Indian Ocean 
CSWIO) for the development and management of fisheries in the 
South West Indian Ocean. The Committee had as its members
Comoro, RE—Union (France), Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Seychelles, Somalia and Tanzania. The Zone is 
said to have been chosen in accordance with the principal c<f 
"natural management areas, on the basis of common 
geographical features: hydrographic, biological and socio­
economic, such that regional cooperation and transfer of 
technology is most likely to be effective."'^
The South West Indian Ocean, therefore, while a smaller 
part of the Indian Ocean, equally reveals most of the 
c har ac t er i st i c s of its larger part — less productive and 
narrower continental margins in comparison to other oceans 
such as the Pacific and the Atlantic.® Perhaps its 
significant and basic characteristic is the fact that fish 
catches provides the bulk of the animal protein requirement 
for many of its coastal communities and thousands of .jobs to 
fishermen in this area.
The total catch frcirn this region is estimated at 221 000 
tonnes of which about 162 000 tonnes (about 73X) are catches 
by artisanal fishermen,® who as it was observed in the case 
of Tanzania, are amongst members of the society that are not 
so well. On the other hand the industrial fisheries land 
about 150 000 tonnes of tuna."'^
It is estimated that the SWID countries have a combined 
fishermen population of of over 77 000 though mostly at 
subsistance level.® This number obtains a larger and probably 
more serious implication if one would bring into 
consideration the total number of people living direcly from 
fisheries as family members or as support sectors.
Although artisanal fisheries are so valuable in most of 
the SWIO countries it is unfortunate that present catch 
levels for the region are assumed to be near the estimated 
potential for the zone which suggests that the countries 
must increasingly become aware of this fact and work towards 
ensuring that stocks available to artisanal fishermen do not 
become over exploited by the industrial fishery.
The question therefore is to what extent have the
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countries of the SWIO region lived up to this c 
Admittedly all- the countries have been striving 
officially committed to the development of their fisheries 
sector. The problem in all respects has been more about
management difficulties then policy committment. In any
event, there are a number of broad and common objectives
which can be identified from amongst the ideals per sued by
the countries of the region; namely:
i1 increasing national food potential; 
ii) creating and expanding employment; 
iii1 expanding the export sector for foreign exchange 
earnings; and,
iv) managing and conserving stocks.
While these goals cannot be faulted, it is noteworthy 
remembering observations made ealier about management 
policies for fishery not being entirely inserparable from the 
larger issue about national fisheries administration and 
development. Management techniques, therefore, within the 
nine SWIO countries have, to a larger €?xtent, been 
conditioned by the economic conditions prevailing in a 
particular country.
What becomes of crucial importance therefore relates to 
an issue which has been amongst the central arguments in this 
study, namely that, proper implementation of any desired 
policy objectives require a sound knowledge of the fishery 
stock and its dynamics, the regular collection of information 
on landings and on the economic conditions.
Perhaps the best review of the general situation in the 
region is as studied by SWIO Project Office which, while not 
involved in regulating fisheries, had acted as an advisory 
body in the management of the fishery resoures in the various 
countries in the region. In its Bulletin of December 1985, 
examining Artisanal Fisheries Statistics in the SWIO Region, 
it is noted that "all countries" have been involved in the 
collection of "statistical data on their artisanal 
fisheries". It notes though that, "the reliability of the
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final estimates of the catch and effort varies from country 
to country". Only Seychelles and Mauritius obtains a mention
of satisfaction.
For the Comoro Islands it is observed that "there is no 
fisheries statistical system established and catch and effort 
estimates are not produced". Problems associated with the 
establishment of a statistical system are said to be funding 
and lack of qualified personnel. There has therefore been nu 
assessment of the resource potential and thus not even 
estimates of potential yield. Here a rough estimate of the 
annual catch is given at 7307 tonnes,® and, the inshore 
waters believed to be nearly fully exploited.
In Kenya, because some landing sites are not covered by 
permanent staff, estimates are based on raising a certain 
percentage above figures obtained from sites covered by 
enumerators. Likewise, here as in the Comoros no estimates of 
the potential yield have been made but it is observed that 
the potential yield may be around 10 000 tonnes in areas only 
within 0 - 20 metre depth which gives fishing grounds of
about 2000 sqkm".’-*^’
In Madagascar, the length of the coastline and the 
isolation of many fishing vilages confines the collection of 
fishing statistics on main markets and therefore rendering 
those figures highly unreliable. It is observed that 
considerable amount of fish is landed and marketed in other 
smaller markets not covered by enumerators and which would 
result in a different statistical outlook. Again, in 
Madagascar there has been no resource assessment necessary to 
the determining of the potential catches available to the 
fishermen.^' However it is also observed that while there are 
biqqer fishing grounds there is a growing competition between
artisanal fishermen and shrimp trawlers.
In Mauritius there is reported to be a relible data 
collection system since 1976 catering for both artisanal and 
industrial fisheries. The statistical unit produces not only 
monthly catch and effort figures but also updates the number
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of both fishermen and their boats. This has enabled the 
determination of the state of exploitation of her resources. 
In 1986 the 758 tonnes of catch was considered bigqer than 
her estimated potential yield of 745 tonnes. =
As for Mozambique, apart from industrial fishery 
statistics, artisanal statistics are not available and 
allegedly would be impossible to obtain due tc< remciteness cif 
many fishing villages and transport problems. It is further 
observed that government policy seems to place "more emphasis 
on the development of the artisanal fishery rather than 
management" with the result that artisanal fisheries, 
statistics have a low priority. Because of this lack of 
i n f i_ir mat i on it has been considered very difficult making any 
estimates about potential yields. However, a preliminary 
figure of 6500 is cited as a working figure.^'*®
In the Seychelles, regular surveys of fish landed on the 
country's beaches are carried hence enabling the country to 
have a reliable data base. The newly created Seychelles 
Fishing Authciy ity undertakes, as in Mauritius, monthly catch 
and effort estimates by boat and gear are produced.
In Somalia there was no data whatsoever on the fisheries 
before 1982. However a data collection system was established 
with the assistance of FAO which began with a promising start 
but with the currently on-going civil war and the total 
collapse of the Somali government administration the industry 
and the statistical system established must have also 
suffered a collapse.
The unsatisfactory situation both for Tanzania Mainland 
and Zanzibar was explained earlier but cciuld be promising if 
a project FAO is recommending inorder to assist the country 
establish a reliable data collection system for its resources 
will materialize.
Accepting, therefore, the fact that the basic 
requirement in the management c>f fisheries resources is the 
availability of information on the state of the stocks being 
exploited, and the economic input of‘ the fishermen or
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industry into such exploitation, it becomes apparent that 
about SO’/, of the coutries of the region do not have a 
framework that can enable them, in that context, to exploit 
their resources with the advantages sucH knowledge may have 
accorded them.
It can also be said that the geographical size of both 
Seyi.helles and Mauritius had also contributed to their 
ability to organize and administer a comparatively better 
statistical system for their countries. In the rest of the 
other countries, two prominent factors seem to play against 
such efforts, namely, 1'j the absence of a concerted 
government effort in that regard, and, 2) the geographical 
disadvantages resulting from ' the isolation of some landing 
sites due to longer distances and poor communications.
And yet, the potential for the region is believed to be 
significant. In a summary of estimates undertaken by SWIO for 
these countries in respect of catches and potential yields 
the following were adduced: Of the main opportunities subject 
to increased landings were the by-catches from shallow water 
shrimp trawling in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique and 
Madagascar. Because in these trawls the target species are 
tlie high valued shrimps the by-catches are more often 
discarded which could have been landed to provide for the 
nutritional needs of the the coastal populations. While no 
apei_ifii_ figure is available, the fact that the incidence of 
by-catch is high in mosb shrimp fishery would suggest 
Considerable potential given the strength of . the shrimp 
trawling industry in these countries.
Significant pelagic resources are estimated as being 
available for Somalia, Mozambique and Madagascar for their 
artisanal fisheries, while Sechelles, Kenya and Tanzania are 
thought as possibly having a somewhat limited additional 
resources. Greater potential is thought to be presented by 
increasing the operational range of fishing crafts beyound 
the inshore waters.
It is of critical importance, nevertheless, to take into
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account that the additional catches further ashore increases 
the possibility of the artisanal fishermen running into 
confrontation with yet another segment of the industrial 
fleet targeting similar resources, and as in many other 
incidences where the two are matched up against each other 
the artisanal fleet has always suffered more than the other. 
In any event this represents one of the crucial managerial 
problems which has to be faced by all the administration 
particularly in the inshore waters.
However, one, of the most important ocean resource common 
to the South West Indian Ocean countries is tuna. And with 
jrggard tCl this resource there has been a significant increse 
in fishing in the region in 1939 and catches by all the 
fishing nations estimated to have considerably increased.^” 
This increase in catch has largely been attributed to French 
and Spanish purse seiners moving into this zone from their 
previous operational grounds in the Atlantic. Species most 
frequently targeted are Yellowfin, Skipjack, Bluefin and 
Biqeye. The principal fishing nations being France, Taiwan, 
Korea and Japan.With the exception of Skipjack, the other 
species are considered as being heavily to over-explcited.
There is thus a general prevalance of foreign fleets in 
the tuna industry of’ the South West Indian Ocean. But like 
the resource themselves which are highly migratory, the 
fleets have also revealed a propensity to easly cross 
nationcil Jurisdictions in pursuit of this high value ocean 
resource.
This pursuit for tuna has consequently brought about a 
dramatic change of fishing technology in the region. While in 
early ISSO's when purse seining was Just replacing longlining 
in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, it was noted that little 
development was taking place in this regard on the Indian 
ocean. However by the mid SO's the wind of change had 
already reached the region such that by the quater of 1939, 
countries such as the Seychelles were reporting 51 purse 
seiners as an all time high.’-” This trend is due to continue
SB
in as much as purse seiners have proven more efficient as 
they have increasingly adopted more powerful winches and 
faster sinking nets.^*^
With this expansion both in fleet and efficieny of gear 
there has also been a corresponding increase on the capital 
requirement to support the necessary investment in vessel and 
gear. Which has also meant increased catches. For the foreign 
fleet- in the SWIO region this trend has shown a yearly 
increase. Table 5.
Consequently, for the countries of the SWIO region, 
without added benefits to their local fishing fleets, the 
growth they require for their own fleets has rather only been 
dismal. This has not been helped by yet the fact that the 
major foreign fishing fleets in the region are similarly Just 
about the Scime powerful operators in the other oceans as 
well, especially in relation to tuna fishing.
The fact that tuna, migratory as they are, are targeted 
by fleets capable of chasing them from one ocean into another 
has contributed to the expotation of changes associated with 
oceanic fishing of these resorces into the Indian ocean as 
well. However, most of these changes have largely been 
confined to the mere precence of highly specialised vessels 
without transfering any technology or assets to the coastal 
states of the region. It could be said that while countries 
are aware of the capabilities of the present generation of 
vessels, they generally remain far removed from obtaining 
advantages associated with the new technologies and 
operations.
And of the oceanic resources of the region, perhaps 
more than any other, tuna constitutes one specie which has 
been largely studied both in terms of biology and migratory 
pattern. This was not, of course, prompted by concern for the 
interest of the coastal states but rather those of the major 
fishing nations. Recognizing that tuna resources like other 
renewable resources can easly be depleted by an unregulated
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TABLE 5.
Foreign Fleet Catches in the SWIO Region.
Year Tons
7. (African catches)
1970 69 500 2.8
1971 76 700 2.7
1972 79 700 2.5
O
1973 79 300 Z. a w?
1974 86 755 2.6
1975 67 885 2.0
1976 62 929 1.6
1977 98 877 o oXm m
1978 97 831 2.4
1979 71 677 2.4
1980 67 325 1.9
1981 70 858 2. 1
1982 89 700 2.7
1983 110 515 3.6
1984 170 858 6. 1
1985 221 460 7.8
1986 231 802 8. 2
Sour c e; Socio — Economic Data Base on African Fisheries.
Bon2on
# 810,
A Horemans B. FAD Fisheries Circular
1988. p 98.
industry and thus place in .jeopardy the major fishing nations
industry and consumption patterns, concerte^d efforts have
been directed towards studies-on the biology and management
of the tuna fisheries not only in
the Indian Ocean but
elsewhere as well.==^ In the Indian
Ocean this subject has
prevailed in the efforts undertaken by the Indian 0«_ean
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Fisheries Commission and is evidenced by the efforts placed 
into the establishment of the proposed Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission with the objective of the management ot the tuna 
r esour c es.
In this section the magnitude and relevance of the 
fishing industry both as a nutritional source and as a 
vehicle for socio ~ economic development in terms of the 
regions resource potential has been underlined. It is clear 
that a great many of the figures given are officially 
classified as speculative. This has a very serious 
implication not only to the exploitation of the resources but 
also to the development needs of our countries. The sooner 
these implications as are examined in the next chapter are 
realised and a coalition of both practical considerations and 
political force are put in motic<n so as to develop mechanisms 
for improving data collection and cooperation about these 
resources, the better it will be for the harnessing of the 
potential offered by these oceanic resources.
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4.2. A Justification For Joint Action:
- Constraints and Prospects.
For countries of the South West Indian Oi_ean, 
comprising a variety of socio-economic systems, approaches 
towards fishery resource management have been as varied <-is 
their varying economic and political i_iut 1 ouKs. Because 
fishing is not only an economic activity but has social and 
political implications, approaches in the management of the 
resources have thus been greatly influenced both by political 
developments and administrative structures associated with a
pivon sociO”0Conomic ssttinQ*
Articles 61 - 63 of the the UN Law of the Sea Convention 
sets out the framework for regional and international 
cooperation in the management of EEZ fishery resources.The 
question arising therefore is whether we need tu have a 
further rationale in working towards this objective. Indeed 
it has been lauded as one of the most innovative features of 
the Convention in as far as it highlights the concept 
regional cooperation as a vehicle for orderly exploitation 
and management of the resources of the oceuri. For the SWIG 
countries it offers the opportunity for building a system 
which would complement national and regional efforts while 
striving to establish an effective management regime for 
these countries - Jointly and severally.
The management and development of fisheries in the SWIG 
countries has therefore largely depended on the priority and 
objectives set by respective coastal state. It is dear 
though that these priorities and objectives will require 
increased input in terms of improved knowledge of the
resource and other assistance. Because of the complexity 
involved, some key and often crutial issues of fishery
management will dictate a regional approach for exploitation, 
managerial and developmental objectives. Underlying this 
approach is the fact that difficulties associated with the
implementation of the UN Convention are multi—dimensional, 
involving scientists, planners, legislators, administrators 
and politicians. It would also require the application of 
numerous skills at varying levels — local, national and 
regional.
One of the major difficulties facing administrators in 
the region as pointed out in the preeciding section is that 
fishery resources of the region are not only limited but also 
remain largely unknown in terms of magnitude. The limited 
nature of the resource is due to the the narrow continental 
shelf and deep ocean floors adjoining these countries, while 
lack of knowledge of the bicilogy of the resource is due to 
the general lack of capital and equipment necessary for 
undertaking required scientific research.
On this background, another question that begs for an 
answer is the manner these countries, individually orjointly, 
are capable of realising the benefits associated with an 
extended maritime jurisdiction, namely, i) increased fish 
output for the nutritional needs of the population, ii) 
increased employment and inccjmes, iii) a spring board for 
marine industries activity eg. processing, iv!> foreign 
exchange earnings from sales v) joint ventures, and vi.l 
trainning etc.
Admittedly the extension of the maritime jurisdiction 
provided not only increased fishery resources due to mere 
expansion of fishing grounds but also gave coastal atates the 
responsibilities for managing and developing these resources. 
Amidst economies constrained by availability of funds and 
high expectations, a tendency to resort to mechanisms which 
seemingly provide tangible results in the short term has been 
unavoidable. Because of this prefarance, in some countries, 
notably Mozambique, Comoro, Madagascar, and Tanzania 
artisanal fishery research involving collection of statistic, 
training and technical assistance have suffered in favour of 
lucrative engagements involving species such as shrimp 
targeted by industrial fleets.
OO
Development Opportunities; The existing situation in the 
SWIO countries is not entirely without hope. There is hope 
thouqh based on a number of critical factors. Most countries 
in the region lack clearly spelled objectives which would 
constitute their fisheries policy. Fortunately in the 
region, Seychelles is one single country which has made an 
attempt at the provision of a clear and concise policy in 
this regard. The Seychelles committment is by no means
accidental. In these Islands, fisheries accounted for “over 
10*/. of the GNP and being only second to tourism as a foreign 
currency earner in 1986.== Together with the very high 
dependency of her population on fish for food, there has
grown in the Seychelles a serious awareness of the importan..e
of fisheries to the country which explains why she has a more
elaborate policy on the subject.
In the region, therefore, a common characteristic could
be discerned between countries with respe-_t to their lev 
committment in fisheries development. The Island States, 
Seychelles, Mauritius, and Comoro, without any significant 
land based agricultural activities have had a corresponding 
greater interest in developing their fishery resources than 
their counterparts with bigger crop based agricultural 
economies such as Tanzania, Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique.
In any event the formulation of a policy is largely seen 
as a first major step in the direction towards this otherwise 
neglected sector. It has already been pointed out that 
Seychelles has on the average, the best statistical data base 
fnr its fishery resources in the region and thus also places 
hi. in a better position both in technical and economic stand
points.
The adopted Seychelles Fisheries Policy entitled "The 
Management of Marine Resources for National Development" has
as its major objectives six goals.==
i) To create the maximum amount of Job
oppor tunities;
ii) To ensure the stable development of the
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industry;
To create the optimum linkages with othe sectors 
of the economy;
iv) To maximise foreign currency earnings; *
v) To conserve marine resource in order to ensure 
the long term viability of the industry; 
vi> To establish Mahe as an important tuna centre 
for the Indian Ocean.
It is reported that this policy places "a great 
importance on stable development, as regards resources, 
investment and licencing options. In doing so it, it places a 
clear distinction between resources of the shelf, which are 
reserved for the exclusive use of the Seychelles nationals, 
and the EEZ outside the territorial waters, where foreign 
fishing will be encouraged. The policy statement further 
spells out efforts to be undertaken in developing her 
artisanal fisheries sector by way of taking into account the 
countries socio-ecomomic factors in motivating fishermen. 
Management of the near shore resources is said to be both by 
licencing and the encouragement of private investment.
As for the offshore resources the policy places emphasis 
on what is termed "fair long-term agreements with fishing 
enterprises, covered by state-to-state umbrella agreements." 
It sets to promote Joint ventures and shore investments from 
foreign fishing interests. It further clearly provides that 
licensing of foreign fishing vessels "will take due account 
of the need to use Victoria as a base, its new fishing habour 
and planned support infrastructure". It also commits 
Seychelles to a "leading role in the promotion of research, 
management and possibly survaillance activities". There are 
also spelled agencies responsible and mechanisms for 
training, "mobilisation of technical and economic assistance, 
the provision of credit and the marketing of fish"
The apprciach taken by the Seychelles reveals the 
numerous areas of responsibilities and opportunities which 
the SWIG countries have to actively work for their
realization if their economic and development goals are to 
become a realty. It also attesmpts to address issues of 
regional importance and having a bearing on goals that are 
pursued by other members of the SWIO.
In terms of regional cooperation what is considered 
important has largely been confined to the fact that the 
countries have a limited ability to control and monitor 
exploitation of migratory species, limited ability to utilize 
the resource through proper handling, development and 
marketing, and limited capabilities of resource management.
These limitations constituted what immiediately faced 
many of the SWID countries as they attempted to develop 
management strategies for the exploitation of mostly a very 
large and unfarmiliar area -- the EEZ. For them the simplest 
way to protect social and economic benefits associated with 
this area was a declaration of their respective EEZ. This was 
seen as enabling them to place their authority over the arc^a 
and thus control access to the resources that are known as 
being limited. Licensing of foreign fleets and .joint ventures 
thus acquired a very unique significance in the efforts of 
these countries as a vehicle of realizing their developmental 
goals.
DELIMITATION; While all the countries of the SWIO region 
have extended their fisheries .jurisdiction, even though not 
in a homogeneous way, the delimitation of their respective 
maritime boundaries springs as a problem affecting the 
desired fisheries management mechanisms. This is increasingly 
becoming a problem with the development of surface tuna 
fishing as an incentive for foreign exchange earnings 
stemming from the access agreements with foreign fleets.
The lack of clearly defined borders to the EEZ's of 
ad.jacent and opposite states poses two immediate problems. 
First, it gives rise to a possibility of denying a country 
the benefit it would otherwise have been entitled to but are 
now either credited to another state or to none at all. 
Secondly, it militates against building a reliable system of
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data collection in terms of region and area where resources 
were obtained.
In this region only Reunion/Mauritius, Kenya, Mozambigue 
and Tanzania have made positive efforts to delimits their 
maritime borders though those boundaries remain incomplete. 
The Kenya/Tanzania boundary merely delimited their 
territorial sea on the basis of 50 nautical miles previously 
claimed.No further effort has been taken to clearly place the 
agreement in the context of the UN Law of Sea Convention. 
The Mozambique/Tanzania agreement is rooted on the UN 
Convention but defined the common agreement only up to some 
point in their respective EEZ’s and is to be completed 
pending an agreement between Mozambique and Comoro.
The general situati'on is such that charts and boundary 
coordinates of the EEZ have unilaterally been published 
claiming the apjplication of the median line between two 
neighbours. Given that there is no agreement on the ploting 
of the baselines from where the EEZ is measured, it would 
only seem at present that while this can only form the basis 
of the negotiations, a lot remains to be done in this 
respect.
The urgency of this problem for fisheries management 
stems from the fact that on the event of overlapping EEZ’s of 
two or more countries a fishermen making catches in this' 
disputed area willjbe unwilling to report to any country due 
to the real risk of being called to make payments to the two 
or three countries for the same fishing adventure. Even if 
report is to be made tc> cine of the countries, the accuracy of 
the statistics so made may very likely suffer.
However, the fact that thefe are a number of other 
sectors eqully sensitive to EEZ delimitation, especially now 
that several other countries in the region are engaged in 
petroleum exploration, and, the belief that there may exist 
potentially exploitable non living resources, could incline 
some countries to play a waiting game which, to the contrary 
can only complicate matters in future.
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Supri^ingly, even in the often acclaimed Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) of the South Pacific Islands which, in 
recognition of the importance of the sea to their way of life
and constituted themselves in
1979, to a regional
cooperation organization, have found it easier ‘ to re^legate 
maritime boundary delimitation to "other priorities"-® The 
provisional boundaries adopted by the Forum for fisheries 
purposes may, nevertheless, be a workable arrangement 
particularly in relation to statistical reports.
ACCESS BY FOREIGN FLEETS; It was observed in Chapter II 
that Article 62 of the UN Law of the Sea Convention requires 
the coastal state to promote the objective of optimum
utilization of the EEZ, to determine her capacity to harvest 
the living resources of the Zone and, on the event it does
not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, 
to allow access by foreign states to any allowable surplus. 
Like the Seychelles, virtually all countries uf the region 
have made attempts in one way or another to secure some
benefits from these resources on the context of the spirit of
this provision of the Convention.
For these countries, resources of interest to the
foreign fleets have largely remained shrimps and tuna. Unlike 
the west side of Africa - the region comprising the FAO
Committee for Eastern Central Atlantic Fisheries (CECAF) and 
the International Commission for the South Eastern Atlanti-.
Fisheries (Angola, Namibia S. South Af r ica) (ICSEAF)
comparisons of catches are generally belived to indicate
resources are fully exploited in the later while the SWIG 
region offers a few exceptions where additional effort is 
warranted.With the noted apparent decline in outlines from 
the east atlantic threre has been an increasing shift of 
foreign fleets notably from French and Spanish Ocean and into 
the Indian Ocean resulting into a conspicuous increase of 
catches by foreign fleets which accounted for 62.37. of total 
marine catches from the SWIO.’'^^ Table 5.
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The modalities through which these foreign fleets have 
found access in the region have generally been similar. 
However, the extent to which each cc>untry has obtained 
benefits has immensely differed. In characterising access 
modalities, Lawrence Christy suggested three broad choices 
available to coastal states which included licensing, .joint 
ventures and prohibit ion.
While there were times when both Tanzania and the
Seychelles alternated between prohibition and licensing, it 
seems now that most of the countries are more inclined
towards licensing and .joint ventures. In relation to 
licensing the ma.jor client in the zone appears to be the EEC 
and the target specie being predominantly tuna. A perusal of 
the five bilateral agreements betweenthe SWID coastal states
and the EEC reveal interesting aspects as potrayed in Table 6
Evidently there are some financial benefits acruing to 
the countries but the disparity existing for the same species 
around about the same zone may only be revealing less than 
what is actually taking place. For instance, Seychelles is 
getting six times as much as Tanzania is getting fur 
licensing only 40 tuna seiners while Tanzania is licensing 
not only 46 tuna seiners but 8 longliners as well. Comoro, 
lying .in between, fares even less well for its 40 tuna 
seiners.
What may be in favour of Seychelles could be its 
fisheries policy whose implementation has not only seen the 
up“grading of its Victctria pc>rt facilities especially for 
fishing vessels, but also the investment in an infrastructure 
which has proven to be very conduicive to the operation of 
ocean going fishing fleets.
Which is why, because many of these vessels would call 
on the Seychelles Port for bunkering, cold storage or 
transhipments it would not be easy or worthy the risk for any 
licences to cheat on the Seychelles. However it would be 
profitable to obtain a higher number of licences from a 
country that has the least capability to check on the fishing
Table 6
Country
CoMoro
Madagascar
Mauritius
Soychollcs
Tanzania
figreoMont
Duration
Total
CoMpansation
Ri/erage
Ecu/yr
Prograti
Financing
Training Licensing Other
3 yrs 900000 300000 500000
10 Tuna Seiners Possibility of 
other species
3 yrs ISOOOOO(equal to 12000 
tonne/yr5
600000 
<nax. of 
1000000 ecu?
900000 crustaceans
600000 highly
Migratory species
500000
5/yrs 15 Ocean going 
freezer tuna seiners
3 yrs 1200000 100000 180000 + 150000 for searching new 
fisheries
120000 10 tuna seiners Additional fee of 100 grt poleliner 50 ecu on catches 
1200 grt crustace over 7500 t/yr
3 yrs 6900000 2300000 2700000 including equipnent for inspection 
services
300000 10 tuna seiners Possibility of other species
3 yrs 1050000 350 000 for 
TOGO t/yr ft 50 
per additional
130000
ecuton
200000 16 tuna seiners
8 longliners
Possibility of 
other species
operations once licence is granted. No wonder transhipment 
reports recorded by the Seychelles seem ccintinually on the 
increase and representing catches other than those allegedly 
made outside of the Seychelles' EEZ.=® The risk here is that 
it could very well also represent catches within the
Seychel1es'EEZ.
Indeed only Seychelles amongst the SWIO countries can be 
said to have obtained significant gains from licensing 
foreign fleets. And these gains are more notable on the 
effect to the industry and the infrastructure it had 
generated for her economy. The EEC/Seychelles agreement has 
also a rc-;quirerrient for the licensed fleets to land part of 
their catches to the local canning industry such that it is 
reported that "around 300 Seychellois now work at on-shore 
installations because the Seychelles have become the chief 
transhipment habour in the region. The Seychelles, though, 
are apparently not aware where these transhipment catches are 
made from as they lack an adequate control system.®^
Underlining the importance of survaillance and 
enforcement the SWIO coutries were cautioned as early as 
1334, of the limited survaillance capability that 
individually they can affford, Regional cooperative schemes 
such as the Forum Fisheries Agency of the South F’acifi'- 
Islands was recommended as being not only cost effective but 
that it offers a better scheme of protecting the i_ummun 
interest they have in granting access to foreign fleets. A 
cooperative arrangement would, apart from harmonising ac>_ess 
conditions, also streamline procedures for data reporting and 
hence a reliable data bank for the region.
There is enough evidence to support the fact that any 
licencing regime that does not have adequate survaillance and 
enforcement capability should not expect satisfactory 
compliance of its regulations. In a study about compliance of 
fishing regulations and enforcement conducted by Dr. Sutinen 
and his associates at the Universty of Rhode Island it was 
shown that the higher the probability of being caught and
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convicted, the lower the rate of violation and confirmed the 
fact that enforcement is a clear deterrent.®® This aspect 
obtains extensive analysis in "Measuring and Explaining 
Noncompliance in Federally Managed Fisheries"®'^ where in 
examining what is termed the Theory of Compliance Behavior, 
the authors argue that "on the whole, individuals act in 
their own best interest, choosing alternatives that are 
expected to bring them the greatest gain or the least loss". 
This in many ways confirms personal experience with fishermen 
in Newquay and Boulc>gne when, in relation to mesh sizes and 
area zoning, most confided that they were more inclined to 
contravene the regulations which rob them the ability to 
service their loans. With slack enforcement, the tendency for 
fishermen has always more often beconed towards taking the 
risk. Under reporting within the SWIO tuna catches must 
therefore be a reality which, under the circumstances, is 
Just unavoided.
In relation to the fees payed to the licensing countries 
the Workshop on Licencing and Control of Foreign Tuna Fishing 
reviewd three types of fe?e structures, namely, lump sum 
payment; taxes on effort; and, taxes on royalties wn catch.®® 
The SWIO countries have as per Table 7 shown a prefarence for 
the lump sum method due to the simplicity of its 
administration and assured minimum payments for a given 
period of time. Weaknesses attendant to enforcement, resource 
assessment and general managerial capab i 1 it iesi of the 
countries have equally dictated this approach which is not 
necessarily the best approach for the regional developmental 
objectives. The absence of a common approach by these 
countries both in terms of licences and survaillance and 
enforcement will, with the exception of ‘ the Seychelles, 
always militate against the bulk of their interests.
JOINT VENTURES: For the SWIO countries the importance of 
Joint ventures and licensing arrangements arises basically 
from the fact that, they are, like many developing countries, 
largely dependant on foreign participation to exploit part of
their fisheries resources. Admittedl y > this is alsci due tci 
the fact that these countr-ies have only taken up to the 
developing of their industrial fisheries mostly after the 
1982 UN Convention. The industry is therefore relatively 
smal1.
The reliance on foreign participation on their fisheries 
sector is therefore a reflection of a general lack of 
capital, infrastructures, markets, tachnical and manegarial 
skills and other important skills necessary for the 
development of their industril fisheries, especially in 
relation to the relative complex and capital intensive 
expoitation of the off-shore resources.®®
Not suprising therefore the SWID countries have one 
after another strivesd to attract foreign investors on the 
hope that the foreign partner will be able to improve their 
incapabilities and secure an undertaking resulting in mutual 
benefits to the two parties and particularly to the economic 
development of the host partner.
It is in this context that countries in the region, such 
as Tanzania, have actively resorted into the formulation of 
legislation intended to promote and protect foreign
investment, including ventures in fishing. It is also true, 
however, that the experience of Joint ventures in the SWID 
countries is relatively new. It may be too early to make a 
critical evaluation of such partnerships but, more 
importantly, texts of such agreements are not readily 
available due to claims of confidentiality.
Nevertheless, Greboval coffers a very illumiating study 
of the potential benefits and pitfalls related to Joint 
ventures.®"^ Due tc* the fact .that the pcirties have bc>th 
complementary and conflicting interests, Joint ventures can 
be disastrous. Great caution is advised. It is observed that 
they could be "more complex to evaluate, negotiate and 
implement than any forms of foreign participation and involve 
a greater element of risk, as losses, as well as profits, 
will be 'shared' under such an arrangement." That, "the risk
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involved relates both to the very nature of any fishing 
operation and to the many, more or less sophisticated, 
financial manipulations which the more experienced partner 
may use to evade a fair sharing of any profit or losses.
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Sustainable Development: A re definition.
"The management and >;onservat ion of the 
natural resource base, and the orientation of 
technological and institutional change in such 
a manner as to ensure the attainment and 
continued satisfaction of human needs for 
present and future generations. Su>_h 
development conserves land, water, plant ano 
genetic resources, is environmentally non- 
degrading, technologically appropriate, 
ecologically viable and socially acceptable".^
5.1 A Summary of the Issues.
The study has made an attempt to examine Tanzania's 
needs and efforts towards the development of her marine 
fishery resources and the challenges this poses in the 
context of general maritime administration. It has observed 
that the ocean environment surrounding Tanzanian coastal 
waters is characterized by a pronounced lack of upwellirtg 
areas which, when combined with the narrow continental shelf 
adjoining her coast, results in a limited productive area and 
consequently an offshore zone with limited resources. 
Nevertheless, the study has also shown that this zone 
supports significant fishing activity the bigger part of 
which constitutes a larger artisanal sector accounting for 
over SO*/, of Tanzania's marine catch landings. The same 
grounds have also supported a growing industrial fleet aimed 
it maximizing the benefits of Tanzania's fishery resources 
especially in relation to foreign exchange earnings.
Because what has been characterized as the Governments
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objectives amounts, among other, to an overall effort to 
increase food supplies, improve employment opportunities and 
earning foreign exchange, the strategies and directives for 
fishery development adopted by the Government for the 
implementation of these objectives have revealed constraints 
largely due to inconsistencies with the desired objectives.
Nonetheless, a considerable potential for Tanzania's 
fishery development has been observed, but equally
substantial are the complex management factors necessary for 
the efficient exploitation of the .resources and the 
establishment of a successful fishing industry. Because the 
exploitational goals seek to satisfy social objectives and 
yet ensuring profitability for economic development based on 
resources that are renewable, the need to balance these 
interests, amidst pressure for quick and visible results, has 
proven to be both challenging and largely damaging. In 
relative terms therefore, given the Government's development 
objectives, the fishery sector provides a minimal
contribution while it has the potential to have done a lot 
better. Consequently, what was said of Ethiopia could very 
well apply to Tanzania: " a poor developing country is thus
an example of one which is currently unable to utilize its 
natural resources at time of its great need - domestically 
as a source of protein or externally as a source of foreign 
exchange.
The predicament facing Tanzania is , incidentally, not 
one of ignorance in terms of what needs to be done but one 
rooted in the failure of the political machine to appreciate 
the essence and potential role which’the sector, given the 
right inputs which are not entirely lacking, could contribute 
to the general welfare of the nation though not necessarily 
in the short term.
On the whole, however, Tanzania, like most nations 
following the Law of the Sea Convention, has shown the 
necessity of obtaining skills and technologies relating to 
the fishery sector as well as the adoption new policies and
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strategies for the management and development of this sector 
which was until recently the most neglected. In the context 
of this neglect, it turns out, the artisanal fishery has been 
the most underdeveloped segment of all the marine sectors.
As a result, the fishery sector seem to ‘have been
undermined by the following factors:
For the artisanal fishery, the outmoded technology has 
been its greatest drawback. While the sector has continuously 
expanded in terms of employment of fishermen, the recorded 
catches have not matched up to this increase. This may either 
imply that the resources are over fished or at least reached 
their MSY, or that, the traditional boats used a highly 
inefficient fcir economical fishing purposes.
The existing poor infrastructure has also been a major 
hindrance. The lack of appropriate landing sites, storage and 
marketing facilities have placed operational and strategii. 
limitations to the potential expansion of the open to the 
artisanal fishery. The fact that the fishermen have to do 
most of the marketing themselves or rely on vendors has 
equally contributed to this outcome.
Further, equally critical to the development of the 
Tair^anian fistiing industry including its artisanal sector is 
a clear absence of policies or measures that are clearly 
designed to have a multiplier effect on the operation and 
growth of the industry. There is no apparent effort -to target 
the sector as a catadyst for other downstreaim industries that 
fisheries cain potentially spur. The lack of a strong linkage 
in the economic activities in the country has attracted a 
fairly slacken response to the priority accorded the sector.
Another important aspect in this regard for the 
artisanal ' and industrial sector has been the absence of an 
effective managerial regime both for Tanzania's inshore and 
offshore fishery resources. This has two dimensions, one on 
the resource and the other on the organization. On the 
resource, Tanzania suffers from an inability of estimating 
the historical and current state of her stock. Given what is
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even officially acknowledged as considerably unreliable 
statistical information, how does she proceed to manage her 
fishery resources so as to avoid depletion and possible 
eventual collapse? If this has been a . constraint, the 
existing organisation hasn't been of help either. The 
structural deficiencies both legal and administrative have 
severely impacted on the ability of the administration to 
formulate policies and implement measures which would have 
assisted in bringing about change in the manner management 
has attempted to respond to sectoral needs for development.
While this has given rise to the need for strategies 
that are coordinated at the local, provincial and national 
level, the existence of commercially viable tuna resources 
has demanded yet a serious look into a regional approach 
encompassing Comoro, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Seychelles and Somalia.
Most of the limitations facing the Tanzanian fishery 
sector are seen, to a large extent, about dublicabed in the 
other members of the region. Consequently there exists a 
general regional wide deficiency in resource assessment, 
policy formulation and implementation and especially 
weaknesses iri enforcement of regulations. Like most of these 
countries, Tanzania has also suffered apparent disadvaritages 
in view C‘f compensation obtained from fc*reign part ic ipat ion. 
Seychelles, on the other hand, appears to be in a better 
position from which Tanzania may obtain some useful insights.
Marine delimitation of the regions EEZ's pi-esents itself 
as an issue the countries have to face up to as they build up 
a framework for regional cooperation in the conservation and 
exploitation of their ocean resources. Countries negotiate 
and license foreign fleets individually while the resources a 
subject of these licenses are shared stocks or highly 
miqratory species. For these shared stocks there are no 
common management or regulatory regime. All the countries 
suffer from a highly inadequate surveillance and control 
capability of the fishing operations and consequently there
effective enforcement framework. All theis no
claim Jurisdiction over the fishery 
generally very little knowledge about
countries 
resources but have 
the magnitude of the
resources.
It is against this background and setting that Tanzania 
and the countries of the South West Indian Ocean are striving 
to deyelop their fishery resources and in the process provide 
food for their people, raise their standard of living and 
generate economic development for themselves.
5.2 The Alternatives.
The sophistication of fishing technology and the
accompanying increase in the demand for fishery resources led 
to the intensified exploitation of fish near coasts and this 
in turn led to the widespread, though uncoordinated, decision 
by the governments of the South West Indian Ocean iSWIO) to 
expand their jurisdiction further outwards. This was 
characteristic of many States. The aim was to protect the in 
the coastal zones by excluding long distance fleets. The 
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea thus 
created a zone sui generis, known as the exclusive economic 
zone CEEZ!) over which a coastal state would exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction and sovereign rights for the
exploration and exploitation of the natural resources.
Knowing that, at least for most developing states, the 
initial interest was to enable the countries to secure 
authority over an extended area of their waters, the 
Convention resulted in the creation of a territorial regime 
which gave coastal states enough power to control and utilize 
the natural resources of that zone - the EEZ. Consequently, 
under article 5S of the Convention, whereby coastal states 
are granted sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the? natural resources 
of the EEZ, considerable area and resources are placed under 
the jurisdiction of these? states.
This dissertation has stressed the point that for
Tanzania and the other coastal States of the SWIO, if any
benefits are to accrue from their living resources of the
ocean, there are two basic requirements. First, there must be 
the necessary manpower to explore and interpret information 
about the state of the resource. This presuppose different 
levels of training in a manner that corresponds to the 
sectoral. Secondly, the harvesting of the resources should
not be an activity that terminates with fish landing and 
marketing at the beach or merely exported to foreign markets
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in an unprocessed form. It must be a planned occupatiun ariu 
managed in a manner which integrates it into the general 
planning and management of the national economy.
Such an integration would entail, among other, 
maintaining full control over the process in which 
information about the resource is collected and updated. 
Training is essential in this context and also in terms of 
meeting identified sectoral goals at each and every level. 
Within the framework of the industry both artisanal and 
industrial, administrators must be able to perceive the 
industry in the context of the countries socio-economic 
activities, that is , to see the possibilities for
diversification while at the same integrating these 
activities into the national economy.
In the examination of the organisational structure for 
fishery resource management in Tanzania it became important 
to see whether, in principle, the existing structure covered 
and made efficient use of all required decision making and 
implementation capabilities. It was evident that as presently 
structured the organization is not conducive to the 
development of the fishing sector. However, because some 
institutional structure exists that has brciadly, thciugh iri a 
fragmented way, dealt with the management of fishery 
resources, what is needed therefore is not only competence in 
the broader issues that concern fisheries but a more 
systematic administrative structure which would do away with 
the hitherto dualty existing at the district, regional and 
national levels. Consequently, there is a strong reason to 
demand that the functions of each of the agencies dealing 
with fishery resources should be cl'osely coordinated at each 
level with other interested agencies, but eventually, only 
the Ministry responsible for fisheries, namely, Natural 
Resources,' Tourism and Environment, should be the key and 
central agency responsible for formulation of policy and 
overseeing its cciord inat ion and impl ementat i'on.
T^finzania is still in the process of formulating its
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national fisheries policy, while lack of the same constitutes 
an important obstacle, the fact that the existing 
institutional arrangements would seem to remain intact even 
after the new policy places in doubt the possibility for 
effective implementation based on ineffective structures. It 
would thus be a failure should the Government attempt to 
execute its new policy amidst institutional structures that 
have clearly proven to be a hindrance.
It has also been observed, in relation to Tanzania, that 
research about the resource leaves a lot to be desired. 
Although there are some modest capabilities that need to be 
recognized of our researches, research institutions and 
training schools, the impact these have had on the management 
of the resource has been only minimal. However, what seems to 
be the major failing pertaining to the direction and scope of 
research activities undertaken is not so much about the 
content but more about focus. There is more in Tanzania that 
has been researched and is known about resources that are of 
high value or of interest to commercial fleets such as tuna 
and shrimps than those that are considered as merely of 
general interest to the artisanal fleet. This contributes to 
an insensitivity which lacks objectivity in an approach to 
developmental issues affecting the fishery sector in as much 
as it fails to an overall assessment of the resource from its 
biological, economic and social implications. It also looses 
concern to the considerable contribution made by the 
artisanal fishery to the national economy.
The extension of territorial waters under the UN 
Convention, resulting in overlapping zones, common stocks and 
the existence of highly migratory species, has created 
circumstances giving rise to the need for cooperation amongst 
countries. While delimitation need be accorded priority, 
Tanzania and the other countries in the region, should see in 
these circumstances the possibilities would not otherwise be 
available to individual countries.
There are significant advantages if the necessary
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pulitical will can bs mavshaled for cc>(n(nc'n achievemen'ts 
rather than dwelling in narrow national interests which in 
the long run are only counter productive. There is no way out 
for a realistic mancigement and conservatory regime for shared 
stocks other than a .joint approach to management regulations, 
surveillance and control efforts. This will not only allow 
for economies of scale in the management demands required but 
also offer common standards for the fishery in terms number, 
of vessels allowed into the region, gear specifications and 
general compliance requirements. It should also provide a 
framework which will promote and assist in the collection of 
national statistics, biological data, interchange of 
information and the opportunity to learn from each others 
experience. It will further provide a forum enabling the 3WI0 
Countries to .jointly negotiate access of their resources by 
foreign fleets. When foreign states are approaching
individual countries as a group, these countries need to 
reciprocate by meeting them and negotiating as a group as 
well. Which is why the? SWIO Pro.ject should not be allowed to 
collapse after FAQ terminates its funding at the end of the 
pro.ject cycle. The members must devise ways of funding this 
pro.ject from license fees or other member contribution 
mechc-in isms.
Lastly, there is need to attempt even the' 
unconventional. In Europe, particularly within the EEC, there 
are efforts to reduce fishing into their respective fishery 
by Scrapping fleets. Owners willing tc> scrap their vessels 
are provided a financial package as compensation and also as 
a way to enable them to relocate into a different undertaking 
Countries such as Tanzania should explore the possibility of 
obtaining some of these vessels, if still seaworthy, through 
its bilateral relationship with the EEC or the individual 
member concerned. This may be used to enhance the capability 
of the local fleet to go further ashore where the resource 
potential is assumed to be higher.
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5.3 Conclusions and Recommendations.
Planning for the management and development of a 
country’s fishery resources is partly a process of reflecting 
interest and policy about . these resources and of 
incorporating them into the national economy. It requires, 
first, the commitment - of the Government to enter into this 
field and, second, the employment of a proper institutional 
arrangements for the administration and management of these 
resources.
The role and the commitment of the Government towards 
the formulation and execution of a policy that works to serve 
the developmental gcials of the fishery sector cannot be ovesr 
emphasised. It is the Government that has authcirity and puwer 
to act as a link between different groups and interests 
within the country. It is the Government that sets up and 
spells out various adrriinistrat ive structures for the 
management of the resciurces. It is only the Guvernment that 
can enter into negotiations both with the adjacent and 
opposite States in matters pertaining to the exploitation and 
regulation of the resources and, in relation to conditions of 
access by forc?ign fleets. It is the Government that must take 
the first concrete step.
Given the need for the Government to adcipt and promote 
new strategies for the management of Tanzaniai’s fishery 
resources, so as to incorporate them into the country’s 
development process, the? following recommendations are made:
1. LEGISLATION.
While Tanzania has enacted the TS EEZ Act to give? 
domestic legal effect to the provisions of the LOS 
Convention, that Act is only an umbrella legislation. 
Further legislative changes are needed for undertaking the 
required implementation of the Convention. In this regard, 
there is a pressing need to establish a legal basis for a 
fisheries management regime, to provide? f or j
118
i) Cl6?arly identifiable administrative structure for 
both Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar and spelling out 
modalities for cooperation and coordination. 
i i .» Har mon izat izat i on and updating of existing laws and 
regulations.
iii) The enactment of regulations providing for 
conservation, management and development of the 
fishery resources.
iv) The prohibition of licenses which provide for carte 
blanche access to "all Tanzanian fishing grounds" but 
designating specified areas instead,
v) A definition of nationality with a clear distinction 
between a "national" and a "non-national", a "local" 
and a "foreign" fishing vessel. With local or 
nationality being more than mere registration.
vi) Licensing of all fishing vessels including canoes of 
whatever description, provided used for commercial 
fishing and, attaching conditions relating to mesh 
sizes, area of fishing, data return etc.,
vii) Formulating and instituting by all the relevant 
sectoral departments, a TS and EEZ Act Implementation 
Action Plan, for the implementation of the LOS 
Convent ion.
2. ADMINISTRATIOM.
An assessment of the existing institutional and 
adfflinistrative capacity for fishery resource management 
reveals inadequacies which must urgently be rectified for 
purposes of harmonizing policy formulation, and execution. In 
this regard;
i> The Fisheries Division of the Ministry responsible 
for fisheries should act as the focal point for 
policy formulation and development of the resource, 
ii) Fisheries staff should be accountable to the Division 
and Ministry responsible for fisheries and their 
training coordinated by the same, 
i i i.) Budget allocation to the Ministry responsible for
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fisheries development should be under the sule 
discretion of fisheries authorities for fishery 
development purposes and only to be reallocated with 
their express consent of these authorities at their 
respective levels - district, regional and national.
3. RESOURCE ASSESSMENT and MANAGEMENT POLICY.
The magnitude and extent of the fisheries 
resources of Tanzania are not well known. However, there is 
strong indication that some specific species are over
exploited, or exploited to their maximum sustainable? yield. 
Recognizing that stock assessment is essential for resource 
management and development planning, the following need be 
done;
i) The entire sector of artisanal fishermen should be 
subjected to a regulatory system of declaratory 
reports in relation to their catches and landirigs.
ii) In the short term an effective monitoring scheme for 
stocks that are important to the socio-economic
interests of the fishery shc'uld be instituted, 
accompanied by the necessary training for the
menit or s.
iii) In remote areas, individuals with basic formal
education should be enrolled and trained to act as 
local monitors. Some incentives should also be 
consider ed.
iv) Data collection and processing must be given a higher 
priority so as to present reliable resource
information for effective management and development 
planning.
v) The formulation of the country’s Fishery Sector 
Policy is long overdue. This questions the resolve of 
the Government. The desired sector objectives and the 
management and development measures tc> be taken need 
to be clearly specified. Integration of these 
objectives into the overall national development plan
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must be ensured.
4. STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT.
The artisanal sector accounts for over SO‘1 of all 
catches landed from Tanzanian living marine resources and its 
contribution from the fresh water fishery being even more 
greater. The sector provides an important source for food and 
employment and yet it remains largely undeveloped. There is 
thus a need develop it and to examine the harm that 
traditional fishing may be doing to the resources while 
introducing measures which can improve efficiency in the 
fishing technology and uplift the living conditions of the 
fishing communities. In this context, the following are 
recommended:
i) Re-exarninat ion of the fishery sector in the context 
of a marine industries framework thus establishing 
and promoting linkage between sectors whose growth 
would induce development in other sectors of the 
industry or economy.
ii) Establishment of f inline ial (credit) schemes for the 
fishery sector with special emphasis on the artisanal 
fishery.
iii) Firm Government commitment to a more effective 
administration led by a policy that is developmental 
oriented and designed to create a favorable
infrastructure for the process - resec^rch, planning, 
investment, hcirvesting, marketing, distribution.
etc. ,
iv) Gov63rnment to ensure that basic inputs to the fishery 
such as nets and other fishing gear are made 
available to the fishing communities as a way of 
combating destructive and illegal fishing methods,
v) Assist the capability of artisanal fishermen to go 
far offshore (motorizing) where resources are
estimated to be greater.
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5. INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT.
Admittedly, existing infrastructure has been a 
major obstacle and has restrained development of both 
artisanal and industrial fleets, and the industry in general 
thus denying the country potential benefits which could be
derived from its fishery. To reverse this situation, the
following are recommended:
i) In order to reduce post harvest losses which are 
especially high in the artisanal • fishery, plans 
should be made to up grade, where appropriate, or
provide for handling, processing, transport,
distribution and a marketing framework within which 
the industry can operate, and, in the process provide 
food to distant areas and added incomes to the 
fishermen.
ii) In view of the Governments new investment policy, 
existing facilities do not offer an attractive 
environment for large scale industrial fleets. The 
development of a fishing port either in Zanzibar or 
Dar ~es“sal aam to provide for hand li rig facilities such 
as ice production, storage, transshipment etc.,
iii) Establishment of training programs to fishermen
about product handling for health and commercial 
considerations. Municipal health authorities and the 
Fishery Departnrient to coordinate this engagement.
iv) Timely availability of credit and inputs.
6. REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION.
In the geographical setting which Tanzania is 
located, the extension of territorial waters has resulted in 
overlapping fishing zones CEEZ), and the existence of related 
stocks and highly migratory species which, in turn, have 
increased the relevance for regional and international 
cooperative arrangements for the conservation and 
exploitation of the resources as envisaged by the UN Law of 
the Sea Convention. In this regard, the following are
recommended:
i) Tanzania should strive to ensure that the SWIO 
F'roject does not collapse but structured to promote 
and assist national research programs, data 
collection and appropriate methods of control and 
improvement of the fishery resources, 
i i 1 Establishment, within the SWIO Countries, of a 
harmonized access regime on conditions of
registration, licensing of foreign fleets, and 
charges applicable thereto.
iiil Institution of a' programme for joint negotiations 
for licensing of foreign fleets in the South West 
Indian Ocean.
iv) Establishment of a common and coordinated 
surveillance and enforcement regime which can
incorporate the respective countries navies and air 
forces under speicified civilian obligations, 
v) Delimitation of the regions EE2 to be given priority, 
but in the short term, temporary designation of 
boundaries for fishery statistical purposes be 
resorted to.
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Annex x
fjo, 3 Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone li>89
THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
No. 3 OF 1989
1 ASSENT,
A. H. Mwinyi, 
President
12th June, 1989
An Act to provide for the implementation of the Law of the Sea Con­
vention, to establish the territorial sea and to establish an exclusive 
economic zone, of the United Republic adjacent to the territorial 
sea, and in the exercise of the sovereign rights of the United Republic 
to make provisions for the exploration, exploitation and conservation 
and management, of the resources of the sea and for matters con­
nected with those purposes
[....................................................... 1
Enacted by the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania.
PARTI
Preliminary Provisions .
1.__(1) This Act may be cited as the Territorial Sea and Exclusive
Economic Zone Act, 1989, and shall come into operation on such date 
as the Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, appoint.
(2) This Act shall extend to 2^anzibar.
2. In this Act, unless the context other-wise requires—
“Exclusive Economic Zone” means the marine zone described under 
section 7 of this Act;
“Law of the- Sea Convention” means the law of the sea convention of 
1982 whose relevant provisions are attached as a Schedule to this Act, 
and which provisions this Act seeks to implement:
Short title 
and com­
mence* 
ment
Interpre­
tation
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The Ter­
ritorial 
Sea
Internal
waters
Baseline 
.of territo­
rial sea
The sea­
bed and 
internal 
waters 
vested in 
govern­
ment
The Exc­
lusive 
Economic 
Zone
“a marine authorized officer” means an authorizeo officer mentioned
under section 13;
“Minister” means the Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs.
PARXn 
Territorial Sea
3. —(1) There is established a marine zone to be known as the Territo­
rial Sea.
(2) The breadth of the Territorial Sea of the United Republic shall 
comprise of those areas of the.sea extending up to 12 nautical miles 
measured from the Coastal low waters line as determined under section 
5 of this Act.
4. The internal waters of the United Republic of Tanzania include 
any areas of the sea that are on the landward side of the baseline of the 
territorial sea of the United Republic.
5. The baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea of the 
United Republic is measured shall be the low-water line along the 
coast of the United Republic including the coast of all islands, as marked 
on a large-scale chart or map officially recognized by the government 
of the United Republic.
6. The seabed and subsoil of submarine areas bounded on the land­
ward side by the low-water mark along the coast of Tanzania and on 
the seaward side by the outer limits of the territorial sea of the United 
Republic shall be deemed to be and always to have been vested in the 
government of the United Republic.
PART III .
The Exclusive Economic Zone of The United Repubuc
7.—(1) There is established contiguous to the territorial waters, a 
marine zone to be known as the Exclusive Economic Zone.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), the exclusive economic zone shall not 
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial water is measured.
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (1), where the median line as defined 
by subsection (4) between the United Republic and any adjacent or 
opposite state is less than 200 miles from the baselines of the territorial 
waters, the outer boundary limit of the 2^ne shall be that fixed by
12er-
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agreement between the United Republic and that other States, but where 
there is no such agreement, the outer boundary limit shall be the median 
line.
(4) The median line is a line every point of which is equidistant from 
the nearest points of the baseline of the territorial waters, on the' one 
hand, and the corresponding baselines of the territorial waters of any 
adjacent or opposite state as recognized by the Minister, on the other 
hand.
8. —(1) The hCnister shall cause the boundary lines of the Zone to 
be marked on a sealed map or chart, and that map or that chart shall 
be judicially noticed.
(2) The Director of Land Surveying in the Ministry responsible for
lands, shall keep safe custody of the map or chart referred to in sub-sec­
tion (1), and anybody may, at reasonable time inspect that map or chart, 
or purchase a certified copy thereof.
9. There is vested in the government of the United Republic—
(1) Sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, Con­
serving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, 
of the waters Superjacent to the Sea bed and its subsoil, and with regard 
to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the 
Zone, such as the production of energy from the water currents and 
winds;
(2) Jurisdiction with regard to—
(i) the establishment and use of cartifidal islands, installations and 
structure;
(ii) marine Scientific research, and
(iii) the protection and preservation of the Marine environment;
(3) Other rights in and jurisdiction over, the zone recognized under 
international law;
10.—(1) Subject to this Act, no pe.son shall, within the zone, except 
under or in accordance with an agreement with the government of the 
United Republic:—
(a) explore or exploit any resources thereof; 
carry out any search or excavation;
(c) conduct any research;
. (d) drill in or construct, maintain or operate any structure or device; 
or
(e) carry out any economic activu^.
(2) This section shall not apply to fishing by a citizen of the United 
Republic or from a vessel registered in the United Republic.
Making 
boundary 
lines of 
Zone on 
Charts or 
Maps
Rights in, 
and juris­
diction 
over,
Zone
Exploita­
tion of re­
sources
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Freedom 
of navige* 
tkm, over 
and 
laying of 
cid>lMetc.
Applica* 
ti(m of 
certain 
laws
Au>
tborized
ofBoen
(3) Any person who contravenes the provisions of this section shall be 
guilty of au offence and shall, on conviction be liable to a fine of no 
less than US dollars two hundred and fifty thousand or to imprisonment 
for a term not exceeding five years, or to both such fine and imprison­
ment; and in addition, the court may order the forfeiture of any vessel, 
structure, equipment, device or thing in connection with which the of­
fence was committed.
11: The United Republic shall recognize within its exclusive economic 
zone the right of other States, whether coastal or land-locked, to freedom 
of navigation and over flight, the laying of cables and pipelines and other 
uses of the-sea relating to navigation and communication, such as are 
recognized under international or embodied in a bilateral, agreement.
12.—(1) Any law relating to Fisheries, National Environment Man­
agement, Merchant Shipping, Petroleum and mining shall apply in rela­
tion to the exploration, of natural resources and the question of Marine 
pollution in the terrTtbrial and exclusive economic zone;
(2) The Minister may, where it is desirous so to uo, and with the 
consultation with the appropriate authority and with the approval of 
Parliament, extend the application of any legislation to the territorial 
and exclusive economic zone. .
(3) Where the application of any law is extended to the territorial 
and exclusive zones, Parliament may, where necessary, repeal and re­
enact that law, amend'it, or make such modifications in that law such 
as are necessary to make that law consistent with its application thereto.
(4) For the purpose of this section “appropriate-authority” in relation 
to a law whose application has been extended to the territorial waters 
or exclusive economic zones, means the Minister responsible for the 
administration of that law.
PART IV
Authorized Ofhcers
13. For the purposes of this Act, the following persons are designated 
authorized officers—
(a) fisheries officers of the Government Ministries responsible for 
fisheries:
(b) members of the Defence Forces;
(c) members of the Poh’ce Forces;
(d) officers of the Customs and Sales Tax Department;
(e) KikOsi cha Kuzuia Magendo, otherwise commonly known as. 
“KMKM”;
(f) any other person approved by the Minister.
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14.—(1) An authorized officer may, in performing his duties, exercise Powen of 
• all the powers conferred on him by tWs Act in respect of-—
(a) a Government vessel or structure that is at sea or in port; or . offioen 
<b) a foreign vessel or foreign structure that he reasonably suspects 
of being used in connection with fishing or any other activity 
carried on in contravention of this Act or the regulations.
\2) In the performance of his duties under this section, an authorized 
officer maViF-
(a) reasonably call on any person to assist him; 
use such forces as is reasonably necessary;
(c) require any person to do anything that appe^ reasonably neces­
sary for the purpose of fadlitating the performance of those 
duties;
(d) order that any vessel or structure be stopped;
(e) board any vessel;
(f) search or examine any vessel or structure or any fish equipment 
or thing on board thereof;
(g) require any person on board a vessel or structure to produce any 
document or thing relating to that vessel or structure or the 
persons on board diereof.
(3) An authorized officer who has reasonable grounds to suspect that 
an offence has been commited under this Act or the regulations by any 
person, including any person on board a vessel or structure, may, without 
warrant or other process—
(a) seize the vessel or structure together with any fish, fishing gear 
- or other equipment suspected of being used in the commission
of the offence; or
(b) detain the person he suspects.
(4) Where a vessel, structure or thing is seized or a person is detained 
under subsection (3) an authorized officer shall, where possible, take 
the vessel, structure, thing or person as soon as practicable to the nearest 
port and within a reasonable time cause the person detained to be 
brought before a Magistrate’s court to answer a charge in connection 
with the offence that gave rise to the seizure and detention.
(5) A court may order that any vessel, structure, fishing gear or other 
equipment, device or thing seized under subsection (3) be forfeited 
where the owner thereof is unknown and no claim there to is made 
within one month of the seizure under that subsection.
15.—(1) An authorized officer may, to avoid spoilage or decay of any Sale of 
fish he seizes under section 14, sell that fish in such manner as a &heries ^ likeir 
officer of the Ministry responsible for fisheries directs. to 'qwii
(2) All moneys resulting from a s^le of fish under subsection (1) shall 
be paid into the Consolidated Fund.
- (3) An authorized officer who makes a sale of fish under subsection 
(1) shall give to the person from whom he seizes the fish a receipt 
containing:
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Exemp­
tion from 
fiability.
General
offences
Return c 
property 
seized
(a) the date of the sale;
(b) the quantity of fish;
(c) the amount realised by the sale,
and the receipt shall be signed by the officer.
f4l Where a court dismisses a charge against a person brought before 
it under section 14. it shall, in any case where the fish in the possession 
of that person was sold, order compensation not exceeding the net 
amount realized by the sale to be paid to that person.
(5) Compesation payable under subsection (4) shall be charged on 
and paid out of Consolidated Fund.
16. No liability shall attach to the United Republic, m authomed 
officer in respect of acts done by that officer in good faith m the perfor- 
mnnee of his duties under this Act.
PARTY
OlTENCES AND MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
17. Any person who—
(a) assaults, resists, obstructs or intimidates an authorised officer or 
any person, assisting him in the execution of his duty;
(b) uses indecent, abusive or insulting language to an authorized 
officer in the execution of his duty;
(c) interferes with or hinders an authorized officer in the execution 
of his duty;
(d) by any gratuity, bribe, promise or other inducement, prevents 
an authorized officer from carding out his duty;
(e) Without the authority of an crime authorized officer with any 
articles seized under section 14;
(f) contravenes any provision of this Act for which no penalty is 
provided or the regulation,
shall be guilty of an offence and shall, on conviction be liable to a fine 
not less than USS 100,000 or to imprisonment for a term not cx^edmg 
two years, or to both such fine and imprisonment and, in addition the 
court may’order the forfeiture of any vessel, structure, equipment, device 
or thing in connection with which the offence was committed.
18. Subject to the provision of section 15, a court may order that 
property seized under subsection (3) of section 14 be returned to the 
person from whom it was taken or to a person named by that person 
where—
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(a) the court dismisses a charge brought against that person under 
this Act or the regulations, and it is of the opinion that the 
property can be returned consistently with the interest of justice; 
or
(b) no charge has been brought against any person within a reason­
able time after a seizure has been effected under that subsection.
19. The Minister may make regulations generally for carrying into Regula- 
effect the provisions of this Act, and in particular respecting— t*®”*
(a) any activity relating to the exploration or exploitation of the ^ne;
(b) any activity relating to the economic exploration or exploitation 
of the 2^ne;
(c) the authorization, control and regulation of scientific research in 
the Zone;
(d) the safety and protection of structures or devices in the Zone;
(e) the preservation of the marine environment of the United Repub­
lic and the prevention and control of pollution thereto;
(f) the regulation of the conduct of any person in or upon the Zone;
(g) the conservation measures to protect the living resources of the 
sea.
20. The Proclamation published as Government Notice No. 209 of Govern- 
1973 is hereby revoked. •
(a) the regulation ofthc conduct ofany person in or upon the 2tone; No. 209 of
(b) the conservation measures to protect the living resources of the
sea. _________
SCHEDULE
PART II
Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 
SECTION 1 
General Provisions
Article 2
Legal status of the territorial sea. of the air space over the territorial sea and of its bed 
° and subsoil
1 The sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal 
waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent 
belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
2. Thirsovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as weU as to its bed 
and subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this Convention and 
to other rules of international law.
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